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Abstract
EVALUATING SCHOOL SAFETY USING ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN. Key Jr.,
Wade Denny, 2021: Dissertation, Gardner-Webb University.
A case study was conducted to establish baseline data in determining the efficacy of the
safety and security program at two rural high schools. Using a publicly available Likert
scale survey provided by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), district and school
leaders were surveyed to determine their perceptions of safety and security on the two
campuses. The adult subjects were subsequently interviewed to elicit deeper meaning
behind their scores. A second survey was administered to former students to provide
compare/contrast data. Utilizing the data from the surveys and interviews, the district was
able to determine those things it is doing well as well as those areas in need or missing
altogether from the safety and security program. Based on CDC scoring
recommendations, each of the two campuses was determined to be safe for students and
staff. The data from the surveys have informed the district regarding next steps for its
safety and security program; however, the data are site-specific and are not intended to be
used to compare the two schools–they only measure each location’s unique program. The
CDC survey is a valuable tool that can be used to measure safety and security on any
school campus.
Keywords: crime prevention through environmental design, CPTED, natural
surveillance, mechanical surveillance, territoriality, access control, safety and security,
logic model, risk perception, risk theory
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction
In the realm of public education, there is no more important duty than providing
for the welfare and safety of our students. The National Association of School
Psychologists (NASP, 2013) has done extensive research into studies concerning student
well-being and asserted, “Safety is essential to student well-being and learning. Students
who do not feel supported and safe at school, both physically and psychologically, cannot
learn to their fullest potential” (p. 1). The purpose of this study was to conduct a program
evaluation of the safety and security program of Southeastern County Schools (SCS). The
data collected from this program evaluation will inform SCS as to those aspects it is
doing well and the areas in which SCS needs to improve. Additionally, the data may
provide guidance for other districts regarding assessment and implementation of
environmental design strategies into their safety and security programs. The goal of the
safety and security program is to provide a safe, secure campus for the students and staff
while also maintaining a welcoming, secure environment. The following program
evaluation provides evidence of how well this goal is being accomplished.
In light of the school tragedies that have taken place in recent decades and as part
of the 2018-2019 budget process, the state of campus security in SCS was of significant
concern. In determining the needs of its schools, it was important to also address
concerns that were brought to the fore by the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
shooting in Florida (February 2018). Though there was not a significant outcry, some
members of the local community wanted to know what SCS was doing to address
security on its campuses. As part of these discussions, an overwhelming need as seen by
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some of the district personnel was to address security at the LEA’s high school campuses.
This is also the area in which the county commissioners saw a need and subsequently
allocated funds to begin addressing the concerns. Other than public opinion and specific
knowledge of the campuses, a formal baseline analysis of campus security in the district
had never been conducted. As such, a primary goal of this research was to establish a
baseline for the current state of school and campus security for SCS. The baseline
evaluation conducted herein should be used to inform the district’s current state of
campus safety and serve to inform the district of next steps in the evolution of its safety
and security program.
To establish the baseline for SCS’s safety and security program, this research
utilized an assessment designed by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). With
permission from the CDC (see Appendix A), the Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED) School Assessment (CSA; see Appendix B) survey was
administered to school- and district-level personnel to obtain information concerning the
current perception of security at the district’s two high schools. CPTED, upon which the
survey is based, involves using structural (walkways, signs) and environmental
(landscape design) factors to design-in security and design-out opportunities for crime
(Cozens & Love, 2017; Parnaby, 2006). The concepts involved in CPTED, to be
elaborated on in Chapter 2, are based on increasing supervision and reinforcing a sense of
ownership for the inhabitants without creating a fortress-like atmosphere (Cozens &
Love, 2017).
The three essential facets of CPTED are natural surveillance, access control, and
territoriality (Schneider, 2010). Natural surveillance is simply being able to observe or
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supervise an area (Schneider, 2010). If areas are overgrown with landscaping, for
example, sightlines are disrupted and supervision is compromised. Access control
pertains to limiting the areas in which individuals or groups can enter a specific area or
site (Schneider, 2010). Access control can be achieved through gates, card-control entry
systems, and traffic patterns. Territoriality is simply the idea of establishing boundaries
and the inhabitants’ sense of ownership that is created within those demarcated areas
(Schneider, 2010). Well-manicured grounds indicate to likely offenders that the
inhabitants care about their space and are more likely to be monitoring or supervising an
area.
In each of the three aforementioned CPTED concepts, there are mechanical,
natural, and organized aspects. Natural surveillance is human, but mechanical
surveillance utilizes devices such as cameras. Door and window hardware are mechanical
access controls, whereas shrubbery and signage are passive and considered natural access
control. Organized aspects of CPTED involve placing persons in the environment whose
sole responsibility is to surveil the property (Cozens & Love, 2017; Schneider, 2010).
Examples of organized control or surveillance are security guards or patrols. Figure 1
represents the concept of CPTED territoriality and the aspects involved with establishing
and controlling a delineated area. Assessing the principles of CPTED will provide a
baseline analysis of campus security at the two high schools and provide guidance to the
district in designing future aspects of its safety and security program.
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Figure 1
CPTED Principles

Note. Taken from The Dark Side of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Cozens & Love, 2017).
Overview of the Problem
School security enhancements are often implemented in reaction to an event or
incident. As such, grants or local allocations are often provided to address needs based on
these occurrences and, all too often, already limited school budgets are stretched even
further (Brown, 2015). Rarely do these allocations take into account maintenance and
replacement costs when systems or parts begin to fail (Brown, 2015). Ken Trump, the
president of National School Safety and Security Services, stated, “Schools should be
cautious not to add devices just for ‘security theater’—creating an illusion of security to
make people feel safer” (Brown, 2015, para. 5). Even as a reaction to a major event,
school districts need to exercise caution and explore multiple options before investing
limited funds in security enhancements. Brown (2015) also added that technological
security enhancements can be an asset as a deterrent or investigative tool, but districts
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should not limit their focus to only technological enhancements.
Much of the reactionary nature to school security enhancements and grants or
funding allocations is based on school shootings and the public’s reaction to the heinous
nature of some of these events (Schwartz et al., 2016; Warnick et al., 2018). It bears
noting that although school shootings are particularly devastating in nature, they are rare.
In a July 2017 report published by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), from 1992 to
2013, crime in K-12 public schools decreased on the national level. As indicated in Table
1, total victimization rates and violent victimization rates both declined significantly over
that time period.
Table 1
National Student Victimization Rates Comparison
Total student victimization rate

Violent student victimization rate

1999

181/1000

68/1000

2013

55/1000

37/1000

Note. Taken from NIJ Summary of School Safety Statistics (Carlton, 2017).
Since 1998, the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) has released a
yearly report titled Indicators of School Crime and Safety. The 2017 report, published in
March 2018, acknowledged, “Our nation’s schools should be safe havens for teaching
and learning free of crime and violence” (Musu-Gillette et al., 2018, p. iii). The report
proceeded to state, however, that the only true way to effectively address school crime
and victimization is to have an accurate picture of data related to the extent and nature of
the problem (Musu-Gillette et al., 2018). The trend data, in light of exposure garnered by
extreme, isolated events, show that school crime victimization is actually on the decline
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(Carlton, 2017; Musu-Gillette et al., 2018). Although most of the summarized data are
comprised of 2015-2016 information due to data collection sources and timeliness of
reporting, among the more notable aspects of the Musu-Gillette et al. (2018) report are
the following:
● Nationwide, there were 47 student, staff, and non-student deaths, which
included 17 suicides and two legal intervention deaths.
● Of the 1,168 homicides of school-age youth, 20 occurred at school.
● Students aged 12-18 experienced 749,900 victimizations (theft and non-fatal
violence) at school, which is a ratio of 29 incidents per 1,000 students
(38:1000 for males, 20:1000 for females).
To support the information gleaned from the Musu-Gillette et al. (2018) report,
the NIJ also reports on school crime statistics, and their findings are similar. Overall, the
NIJ asserts that crime at U.S. public schools is on the decline. Admittedly, “high-profile
incidents of violence have…raised concerns about the safety of students” (Carlton, 2017,
p. 1), and this has influenced the public perception of what is actually occurring in public
schools. As is typical of the reaction to school shootings and a trend noted by other
researchers, school officials and the public tend to be more focused on shootings than
other types of school crime. As a result, since the Columbine shooting in 1999, schools
have significantly increased their use of visible security measures such as closed-circuit
cameras, locked doors, and resource officers (Kennedy, 2016). The data analyzed by NIJ
tell an interesting story; however, regarding staff supervision and locker checks, these
security measures have increased little, if any, during this same time period (NIJ, 2017).
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Statement of the Problem
SCS is a small, rural school district located in northwest North Carolina. There
are approximately 5,600 students attending 14 schools (eight elementary, two middle,
two high, one early college, one alternative). There are two high schools in Southeastern
County, Eastern High School (EHS; Appendix C) and Western High School (WHS;
Appendix D), that serve a combined average daily membership of approximately 1,500
students. Both high schools were initially completed and opened in 1967, and all of their
original facilities are still in use with a few additions. The county in which they are
located has four incorporated towns: two feeding EHS and two feeding WHS. EHS, at
165,000 square feet, houses approximately 900 students; while WHS, at 145,000 square
feet, is attended by approximately 600 students.
When the high schools were originally constructed, their layouts were very
similar. The original design had five separate buildings around a central courtyard. The
buildings were connected by a covered walkway that encircled the perimeter of the
courtyard. There have been additional buildings constructed at each site since 1967 to
accommodate growing enrollment numbers; however, there are no immediate plans to
add more structures due to declining enrollment trends. Both schools have large student
parking lots that are located between the school buildings and the main roads on which
they are located. The athletic fields are located adjacent to the buildings and student
parking, with only one field at EHS not immediately accessible from parking areas or a
primary campus building.
A unique element of the design of the two schools is that the main office is
located in the building furthest from the road (see Appendices C and D for office
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locations); therefore, most times of the day there is little adult supervision on the front of
the campus. A School Resource Officer (SRO) works out of each school, but their
workspaces are also located on the rear of the campuses so they are close to the
administrative offices. Visitors often drive around to the rear of the school when trying to
reach the offices, even though there is designated visitor parking located on the front of
the campuses next to the school buildings.
Combined with the locations for the administrative offices, the visitor parking has
created cause for concern in recent years. With scant supervision on the front of the
campus, visitors who use the designated parking at the front of the campus then walk past
occupied school buildings and across a courtyard before their presence is known. At
certain times of the school day, this often puts visitors in close contact with students long
before administrators or other staff members may be aware of their presence.
At the March 2018 local board meeting, which was held 2 weeks after the
shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Florida, one of the board
members referred to the district’s high schools as an “easy target” (Anonymous, personal
communication, March 5, 2018). The SCS superintendent mentioned specifically the idea
that our campuses are open, the adults are in the back and the students in the front, and
there are multiple buildings. A second board member explained how he had visited one
of the campuses and walked around for several minutes before an adult acknowledged his
presence. The prospect of this occurring with someone who had ill intentions caused him
to question what more could be done to secure our campuses. A secondary concern
expressed by the board member was how vulnerable the student body could be during
break time or class changes when there are significant numbers of students in the
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courtyard. These students, he felt, were “fish in a barrel,” and the district should begin
investigating ways to more closely monitor, or altogether close, the courtyard.
In examining the appendices, it is worth noting that there are multiple entrances
into each of the high schools. WHS (Appendix D) has two entrances from the main road
to the south and a separate entrance north of the football field from a side road. EHS
(Appendix C) has even more complex access points: a driveway on the western edge of
the campus from the main road to the north and a second shared driveway accessed from
the north on the eastern edge of campus. The eastern driveway is shared with the middle
school to the immediate east. There is also a short driveway that accesses a separate
student parking lot from the north and a third access point from the eastern side of the
middle school (not shown in Appendix C) that allows access to the rear of the high school
campus. To further complicate matters at EHS, there is a secondary student parking lot
that does not use any of the aforementioned access points, instead relying on a single
entrance off of the main road. It bears noting that the secondary student lot does not have
direct vehicular access to the physical school facilities. Combined, there are seven access
points between the two schools, each of which has historically been open and accessible
before, during, and after school.
SCS elementary and middle school campuses are largely single or connected
buildings. In the instance of a stand-alone structure, the district’s safety protocol
stipulates that exterior doors remain locked at all times. The elementary schools have had
buzz-in systems for the past few years, and these same systems were installed in the
middle schools in August 2018. Buzz-in systems allow exterior doors to be locked so
visitors enter only when “buzzed in” by an adult staff member. The high schools,

10
however, are a different world altogether. Locking the exterior doors is not an option at
this time because high school involves frequent class changes and freedom of movement
not necessitated at the other schools. The exterior doors that open onto the central
courtyard are unlocked during the hours the schools are in operation, while the exterior
doors that open to the perimeter of the campuses are to remain locked. If the high schools
had card entry systems, it would be possible to keep all doors locked during the school
day. This option, however, has been investigated and determined to be cost-prohibitive.
Local Area of Concern
Looking at Table 2, based on school environment statistics taken from the 20162017 North Carolina School Report Cards, SCS’s two high schools are not violent or
dangerous as compared to other high schools in the state. The 2016-2017 state average
for criminal acts per 100 students was 1.21. EHS and WHS both came in well under the
state average: 0.0 and .70 per 100 students respectively. Further, for the same year, the
state average for short-term expulsions was 17.75 per 100 students. Again, EHS and
WHS were both well below the state average with 9.42 and 3.65 per 100 students.
Neither school had long-term suspensions or expulsions for 2016-2017.
Table 2
2016-2017 LEA School Environment Statistics (Per 100 Students)
Criminal acts
EHS
WHS
Local LEA
State Data

0
.70
.24
1.21

Short-term
suspensions
9.42
3.65
6.22
17.75

Long-term
suspensions
0
0
0
.09

Expulsions
0
0
0
0

This does not mean, however, that the district is willing to take a wait-and-see
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approach to address monitoring or security issues. The campuses are large and designed
based on an open concept, which has been acknowledged by the superintendent and
school board during open comments during at least two board meetings, but the district
and its board members want the campuses to continue to be welcoming to visitors,
students, and the school community at large. Erickson (2010) stated that campuses “must
be both secure and welcoming” (Secure, Yet Welcoming section, para. 1), and it is very
important that the district also acknowledge this aspect as it attempts to enhance
supervision and security on the two high school campuses. As a second board member
stated at the March 2018 meeting, he is “willing to listen to all ideas and while nothing
would be 100% effective, we can try to prevent tragedies the best we can” (Anonymous,
personal communication, March 5, 2018).
As part of the 2018-2019 capital outlay budget request, the local board of
education requested funding from the commissioners to construct or modify structures on
the two high school campuses. The primary function of these structures was to house an
adult who could provide supervision at the main points of entry for each campus. Funds
were subsequently allocated to provide structures on the front of the high school
campuses, and they were put into service in August 2018.
The next issue was to determine who would occupy the structures. When the
campus monitoring position was first discussed, the superintendent was presented with
the option of stationing the SROs inside the monitoring stations. This same scenario was
presented to the principals, but they were not in favor of this idea. They view the officers
as deterrents and prefer they be among the students when possible. The district eventually
agreed to utilize classified part-time personnel already in the system to work in the
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monitoring stations. With construction of the structures and authorization of the
personnel, two facets of CPTED were immediately addressed: natural surveillance and
access control.
To assist the monitors, and once most students have arrived on campus,
custodians lock gates on all the secondary entrances (see Appendices C and D). During
school operating hours, all traffic accesses the campuses from a single entrance instead of
having multiple options. This also assists in keeping track of students who are entering or
leaving campus throughout the school day. Before dismissal, the custodians unlock all the
gates to aid in the flow of traffic leaving campus. In designing this protocol, the district
has been very careful not to interrupt the flow of traffic onto campus so student drop-off
and pickup procedures could remain largely unchanged.
The monitor is going to be the first individual students and visitors encounter
upon entering either high school campus. It is not the expectation of SCS that the
monitoring personnel have enforcement duties, as these responsibilities are the domain of
school administration and the SROs. Summarized from the SCS superintendent’s campus
safety and guard buildings presentation from August 2018 (see Appendix E), a simplified
checklist of the monitors’ duties and expectations are as follows:
● Stop and greet all vehicles and persons who enter the high school campuses
between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m.
● Ask the identity of the individual(s), their purpose, and direct them to the
appropriate location.
● Advise the office via radio of the identity, purpose, and location of the
visitors.
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● Monitor foot traffic outside the perimeter of the school buildings, especially in
the front parking lots, and notify the office of individuals outside of that
perimeter.
Once the visitor’s presence has been communicated to the office, the specific
duties of the monitoring personnel essentially cease, and it becomes the responsibility of
the school-based administrative staff or SRO to be aware of visitors and provide further
assistance. As part of the training, monitors have also been provided with guidelines and
information concerning the district’s emergency and lockdown procedures. For their
respective schools, they are the early warning system should they detect someone who
may be determined to have ill intent or otherwise should not be present on the campuses.
SCS Safety and Security Program
A crucial step in creating a safety and security program was to
transfer coordination of electronic surveillance responsibilities to the Safe
Schools coordinator. The Safe Schools coordinator is paid through at-risk
funds and was an existing position within the school system. In preceding
years, SCS contracted for security services through a third-party
dealer/installer. Beginning with the 2018-2019 school year, SCS took
ownership of these systems at an immediate cost savings and turned
them over to the Safe Schools coordinator. The Safe Schools coordinator is
also responsible for monitoring and maintaining emergency procedures
for threats, lockdowns, evacuations, and natural disasters; however, these
are not at the core of this program evaluation. As it pertains to this study,
the Safe Schools coordinator is responsible for updating and maintaining
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the electronic fire and security systems.
The funding for updating the electronic systems came from cost
savings due to eliminating the third-party monitoring contract and the
security allotment from the 2018-2019 buildings and grounds allocation.
There were no special funds set aside for electronic security due to the
timing of the program’s start; therefore, the initial security contract
allocation from buildings and grounds local funds, totaling $34,000, was
utilized to enter into a direct monitoring contract and begin replacing
surveillance equipment at some of the elementary schools. Natural and
organized surveillance are fundamental aspects of CPTED, and SCS’s goal
of updating digital surveillance equipment to improve supervision is
central to this concept.
Since this evaluation is dealing specifically with SCS’s two high
schools, a second resource utilized for the safety and security program was
to modify two structures at each high school to enhance supervision at the
front of the campuses. Fifteen thousand dollars were earmarked through
2018-2019 capital outlay expenses to modify existing structures, and these
modifications were completed in time for the respective school year.
Personnel then had to be provided to monitor the campuses. The decision
was made to utilize existing part-time classified SCS personnel as campus
monitors. To eliminate overtime, the workday is divided in half, evenly split
between the two personnel at each campus. The total shift runs from 8
a.m. to 3 p.m. each school day, with the shift change occurring at 11:30 a.m.
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The position pays $12.50 per hour for a system-wide total of $175 per day in
wages paid. This will culminate in a total expenditure of $29,400 for the
2018-2019 academic year. The monitors were also provided job-appropriate clothing,

signage, and two-way radios at minimal cost, comparatively speaking. In concert with
site-based administrators and SROs, each of the monitoring personnel received training
regarding expectations, roles and responsibilities, and emergency procedures. Placing
individuals in areas that were previously poorly supervised applies to the CPTED
principle of natural surveillance. Combined with mechanical access control, locking
secondary entrance gates in this instance, SCS has demonstrated utilization of natural and
organized CPTED concepts to help secure the two high school campuses.
There are other CPTED-based goals for the SCS safety and security program; but
due to budgetary constraints, they have not been implemented at the high schools. Of the
steps listed below, many have been completed, while others are noted as being “in
process.” A complete list of safety and security enhancements are as follows:
High schools only
o Manned monitoring stations
o Directional signage and location-specific signage for offices, buildings,
and athletics facilities
All schools
o Bring camera/security systems “in-house”
o Upgrade security communicators–convert from landline to internet
protocol (IP)
o

Upgrade camera systems (in process)
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o Modify landscaping to meet CPTED guidelines (in process)
o Streamline window and door hardware, simplify keying protocol (in
process)
o Control access to property with locked gates during school hours
o Number windows so classrooms can be identified from outside the
buildings (in process)
K-8 only
o Buzz-in monitoring systems (complete)
o All exterior doors locked during school day (standard SCS protocol)
Each of the aforementioned principles is grounded in CPTED ideology,
specifically towards increasing supervision and controlling access to the schools and
grounds. The goal for SCS is to fully implement each facet of the safety and security plan
by the end of the 2020-2021 academic year. For the 2018-2019 school year, SCS only
received $.26/square foot for capital outlay expenses, so expedited implementation was
not an option.
Purpose of the Study
A central aspect of security that is included in this program evaluation is focused
on establishing a baseline analysis of adult supervision as it pertains to two rural high
school campuses. Updating the existing security camera systems and creating clear
sightlines around campus are two measures through which the district is planning to
address adult supervision. Installing high-resolution, cloud-based cameras and controlling
landscaping will mitigate “hiding places” and allow the adults on campus to see what is
going on around them.
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A second element included in the study is to control access to the campuses.
Access is being controlled by securing gates at all secondary entrances so visitors and
other members of the school communities are guided through a primary entrance. In
addition to securing gates, additional signage–both directional and territorial–has been
installed to assist visitors and guide them to the appropriate locations (e.g., main office,
athletics facilities). As a result of these measures, an outcome of enhanced security the
district is hoping to achieve is to make the campuses more secure, while also being
careful not to affect the perception of the campuses as inviting, nurturing places of
learning.
Research Questions
When enhancements have been considered, schools must acknowledge the
public’s perception when safety measures are being discussed or implemented. In concert
with Erickson (2010), SCS is investing in enhanced security while also striving to
maintain welcoming campuses for the immediate school community and the general
public. A review of the literature demonstrates that there is such a thing as too much
security, especially regarding mechanical security measures. Through utilizing the CDC
CPTED security assessment, this evaluation is going to attempt to gauge staff and
community perceptions as they pertain to measures already in place at the district’s high
schools. These perceptions will include evaluating mechanical and natural security
measures, as well as the physical environment of each campus. Through establishing a
baseline for security at the two high school campuses, this safety and security program
baseline evaluation has attempted to answer the following questions:
1. Based on the principles of CPTED, how safe are the two high school
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campuses?
2. Based on CPTED principles, in what areas (mechanical or natural) is SCS
adequately implementing an effective safety and security program?
3. Based on CPTED principles, in what areas (mechanical or natural) does SCS
need to improve its safety and security program?
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Does School Safety Matter?
According to the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools Technical
Assistance Center (REMS, 2018), operating under contract with the United States
Department of Education, school safety matters to all members of a school community.
Perceptions of school safety affect staff retention and parent satisfaction with their child’s
school or district (REMS, 2018). REMS even suggested that perceived safety may have a
greater impact than actual safety in terms of enhancing academic achievement among
students, implying that “when students feel safe, they are better able to focus on learning”
(para. 1). The physical and emotional benefits of being comfortable in the school setting
are critical in determining the conditions under which children learn best (REMS, 2018).
Even more revealing in student perceptions of safety, data quoted in the REMS
(2018) report from NCES demonstrates that the parents of homeschooled children cite the
school environment (perceived safety and culture) in 91% of their responses when asked
why they homeschool. Of those, 25% list the school environment as their number one
factor in deciding whether to attend public school or to homeschool their children
(REMS, 2018). Also quoted in the REMS report was a study of New York City Schools
in which safety was determined to be the most strongly connected factor in student
academic performance. NCES confirmed the link between student perceptions of safety
and academic achievement; however, NCES also noted that of those students who
reported feeling safe at schools, 93.5% also reported having an adult at school who they
believed cared about them (Musu-Gillette et al., 2018).

20
Does Enhanced Security Work?
School safety is making national headlines in today’s media and often for the
wrong reasons. The knee-jerk reaction of schools and organizations is to implement new
measures or beef up existing measures to assuage the public perception of safety in
schools (Schwartz et al., 2016; Warnick et al., 2018). As part of this reaction, federal and
state grants often provide one-time funds for enhancing and improving security measures,
but these measures are rarely funded forward to account for maintenance or training and
mostly serve only to limit hysteria. Tanner-Smith et al. (2018) added, “To prevent crime
and violence, many U.S. schools have increased their use of visible security measures
such as security personnel, cameras, and metal detectors” (p. 104). Warnick et al. (2018)
further added that the “target hardening” (para. 6) approach that is so often a reaction to a
violent incident may exacerbate violence instead of preventing it.
A review of the literature indicates measures that can be taken to enhance school
security, but it also delves into the perceptions of students and staff regarding school
security and safety. Reingle Gonzalez et al. (2016) pointed out that there are two types of
security on school campuses: actual and perceived. In discussing the role of the SRO on
school campuses, Reingle Gonzalez et al. stated that as security measures are enhanced–
the addition of SROs in this instance–the perceived security is viewed as a positive by
school staff. Students, on the other hand, tend to perceive the additional officers as a
negative because, in their view, the officers are only being added as a reaction to a need.
Warnick et al. (2018) explained, “Filling schools with metal detectors, surveillance
cameras, police officers and gun-wielding teachers tells students that schools are scary,
dangerous and violent places–places where violence is expected to occur” (para. 7). In

21
essence, student perceptions of enhanced security measures are not having the intended
effect of making them feel safer. The conclusion from Reingle Gonzalez et al., based on
an analysis of prior research, indicated,
Implementation of more security measures may not be an effective policy, as
results almost uniformly suggest that the presence of more structural safety
measures (e.g., more cameras, video recorders, metal detectors, and/or SROs,
among others) results in a decline of student-perceived safety. (p. 450)
As the previous statement shows, Reingle Gonzalez et al. asserted this is the view
generally held by students regardless of the structural security measure in question.
A second interesting perceptual outcome of target hardening is that teachers may
change how they view students (Warnick et al., 2018). Instead of being children to
educate and “nourish,” teachers may begin to view “students as threats to be assessed”
(Warnick et al., 2018, para. 7), which can have significant educational implications. This
perceptual shift among staff and students can have disastrous consequences for academic
and social/emotional outcomes and needs to be avoided where possible.
Tanner-Smith et al. (2018) analyzed multiple studies regarding enhanced security
measures and indicated that enhanced measures are not a deterrent to violent incidents
but may increase the likelihood of those incidents occurring. Increasing safety measures
at schools is typically a blend of several measures that increase supervision but may not
alter the behaviors they were put in place to monitor. On the contrary, Tanner-Smith et
al.’s research analyses revealed the following:
Overall, the results indicated that some patterns of school security utilization were
associated with increased exposure to crime and violence at school. We found no
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evidence that any pattern of visible security measure utilization was consistently
associated with reduced exposure to crime or violence at school. (p. 113)
It bears noting that even though the findings revealed an increase in exposure to violent
incidents, Tanner-Smith et al. failed to determine whether this was the result of increased
supervision from the security measures put in place or an actual exacerbation of
antisocial or aggressive behaviors from the students. From the standpoint of TannerSmith et al.’s analysis, it could be argued that the security measures were serving one of
the functions for which they were put into place–to detect problems–but it does not
appear they were much of a deterrent.
Programmatic Approach to School Safety
Though dated, a 2005 study by Ron et al. recommended a programmatic approach
to enhancing safety in schools. Ron et al. approached safety from a best-fit standpoint
while noting that concrete measures (more cameras, more personnel, metal detectors)
were one-size-fits-all and may not be the best option for many schools or districts. One of
the many programs rated as effective by the National Association of Social Workers is
the Seattle Social Development Project. This cohort project, begun in 1981, follows
children from first through 12th grades and includes parents and families in program
design and implementation. It is tailored to meet the needs of individual students and
their families as they progress through school. The program addresses antisocial and
aggressive behaviors while simultaneously trying to build attachments to the school.
Based on self-reported data, the program was shown to be highly effective at all grade
levels and is still in use today. Many of the programs outlined by Ron et al. are
intervention-based and have the following common characteristics:
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● Raise awareness of responsibility of students, teachers, and parents regarding
the types of violence in their schools
● Create clear guidelines and rules for the entire school
● Target the various social systems in the school and clearly communicate to the
entire school community procedures to be followed before, during, and after
violent events
● Focus on getting school staff, students, and parents involved in the program
● The interventions fit into the normal flow and mission of the school
● Use faculty, staff, and parents in the school setting to plan, implement, and
sustain the program
● Increase monitoring and supervision in non-classroom areas
As can be noted in the common characteristics above, the staff are trained in how
to work with the events, students, and parents; but more importantly, the parents
themselves play a pivotal role in developing and sustaining this meaningful program.
The Role of Adult Supervision in School Safety
Educators assume a legal requirement to supervise students when they take their
job; however, it warrants mention that few educators consider the process of supervision
as anything more than a rote task for the role they hold (Bliesner & Armes, 2017).
Parents, on the other hand, expect schools to provide a level of supervision that is similar
to what is provided in the home. Educators serve students in the absence of the parent–“in
loco parentis” –and, as such, have a legal obligation to provide a modicum of supervision
(Bliesner & Armes, 2017). As bullying and harassment issues have continued to rise, so
have the obligations of the academic environment within which teachers work. The
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demands of teacher roles, combined with the public’s focus on bullying, harassment, and
other school issues, have forced teachers and school districts to rely on “both the
presence of ‘generally good kids’ and a historic lack of problems” (Bliesner & Armes,
2017, para. 10).
The convergence of academic demands, tragedies in the national spotlight, and
the prevalence of increased claims of bullying and harassment have increased liability for
school districts and educators alike (Bliesner & Armes, 2017; Russo, 2014). Litigation
has increased the pressure on districts and personnel to adequately supervise students and
be “reasonably” aware of anticipated harm. The litmus test generally applied by courts is
that an educator should provide better care than a reasonable adult but less than a
reasonable parent (Russo, 2014). If a tragedy or other incident should occur, this
delineation creates a tremendous burden for school districts that fail to supervise their
students accordingly or do not address harms that any other individual could reasonably
foresee (Russo, 2014).
For schools that are trying to determine the appropriate level of supervision for a
given area or activity, they need only ask themselves if the supervision they have applied
is defensible in court (Bliesner & Armes, 2017). Many schools and districts rely on
surveillance equipment to provide this supervision for their campuses, yet cameras often
only provide a record of an event or incident that has already occurred (Schwartz et al.,
2016). Adequate supervision of students, however demanding on the profession, is a
measure that costs nothing but can prevent incidents from happening in the first place
(Bliesner & Armes, 2017).
General supervision is a standard that should be applied any time students are in
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buildings (Bliesner & Armes, 2017), and this refrain has been reiterated in SCS district
leadership meetings. Before, during, or after school, this level of supervision should
apply. Professional expectations are also growing, and when this occurs, other teacher
responsibilities may become less of a priority. The balancing act of demands, in turn,
“exacerbates the challenges of effective supervision” (Bliesner & Armes, 2017, para. 9).
Several factors play a role in sufficient supervision; among those factors are having an
adequate emergency plan in place (Essex, 2012), knowing which areas may promote
disruptive behavior (Bliesner & Armes, 2017; Essex, 2012), and knowing when to
recognize the need for more supervision or intervention (Essex, 2012). Essex (2012)
stated further that there are two questions any school employee should ask themselves to
determine if their own efforts are sufficient:
1. Can your supervision be reasonably defended to the parent or guardian of an
injured student?
2. Can your supervision be defended in court?
For these reasons, the design of school campuses must be modified and enhanced to
facilitate adequate supervision from all the adults on campus (Russo, 2014).
Secure School Components
The immediate school community and the public at-large need to know that
districts take the security needs of their schools seriously and that they are doing
everything within reason to protect every community’s most valuable asset, the students
(NASP, 2013). Erickson (2010) noted several security measures schools can use to
address safety and security. Appropriately, the measures outlined by Erickson are not
intrusive and fall within the findings established in the literature that has been reviewed
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so far. In particular, Erickson embraced an approach called CPTED, in which the built
environment enhances security without being intrusive or burdensome. Among
Erickson’s recommendations were
● A welcoming site entrance with appropriate signage
● Easily identifiable vehicular and pedestrian pathways to route visitors toward
designated areas
● Designated and ample visitor parking
● A well-marked main entrance to the building(s)
There are other design aspects noted by Erickson (2010) that affect the building
envelope without, again, being intrusive. Erickson repeated the theme of planning
throughout his article, stating specifically, “Committees creating strategic plans...are
critical for healthy learning environments, and [they] try to identify facilities
improvements that achieve that goal” (para. 2). Controlled entrances, high-definition
cameras (not more cameras), low-height lockers, and proper maintenance of door and
window hardware are among the list of suggestions Erickson made for incorporating
security measures into the built environment. Each of these measures can be incorporated
into a school’s safety plan and design without making students feel as though they are
being constantly monitored, providing the secure and welcoming environment Erickson
espoused as necessary for learning.
Spicer (2017) built on the CPTED concept and advocated utilizing the built
environment to enhance security using natural surveillance and access control. An
element of CPTED Spicer believed is critical to security is “territoriality,” which is a
“clear delineation of space [that] creates a sense of ownership for legitimate users”
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(Territoriality section, para. 1). The idea of territoriality clearly marks areas, but Spicer
did not recommend erecting barriers to do so. Instead, Spicer advocated for the utilization
of walkways, shrubbery, and controlled entrances to create the barrier. These lessintrusive barriers create natural patterns of campus egress and ingress that legitimate
users acknowledge and identify those persons not using them properly as individuals who
may not need to be on campus (Spicer, 2017). “Situational awareness” is another idea
shared by Spicer and Erickson (2010). There is no replacement for active, responsive
adult supervision because, as Spicer elaborated, “You cannot change that he is coming,
but you can determine when you observe his intent” (Situational Awareness section, para.
2).
The website for the North Carolina Department of Public Safety (NCDPS, n.d.)
has a page devoted to CPTED concepts. Specifically, NCDPS lists natural surveillance,
natural access control, and territorial reinforcement as instrumental concepts in
environmental design. NCDPS developed these concepts further into the three Ds:
● Designation–All space has a designated purpose
○ Does the designated purpose match the intended purpose?
● Definition–The space and how it is defined also define the acceptable
behaviors
○ Is the space clearly defined?
○ Is it easy to tell who owns the space?
○ Are there any signs noting territorial or behavioral expectations (i.e., Do
Not Enter)?
● Design–Space is designed to support or control behaviors
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○ Is there confusion between the design and the behaviors?
○ Does the space support the desired behaviors?
According to the International CPTED Association’s website, CPTED is a
concept that was coined in the 1970s by C. Ray Jeffery. The International CPTED
Association continued by defining CPTED as,
A multi-disciplinary approach for reducing crime through urban and
environmental design and the management and use of built environments. CPTED
strategies aim to reduce victimization, deter offender decisions that precede
criminal acts, and build a sense of community among inhabitants so they can gain
territorial control of areas and reduce opportunities for crime and fear of crime.
(para. 1)
Initially designed for urban planning and law enforcement agencies to deter urban
crime, CPTED concepts have found themselves becoming more prevalent in many other
settings due to the relatively low cost of implementation as compared to more mechanical
security measures (Sutton, 2016). Also referred to as “designing out crime,” CPTED is a
site-based security implementation program that can be tailored to meet the needs of each
unique space in which the principles are applied (Lasky, 2013; Reynald, 2011) while
avoiding the fortress-like characteristics of many other security enhancements. The
hallmark of CPTED is that it is built around crime prevention instead of being a reaction
to an event or incident.
The three primary facets of CPTED are natural surveillance, access control, and
territoriality (see Figure 1). Natural surveillance simply means the ability to see what is
going on. The surveillance is “natural” because it is creating a physical environment that
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is easily observable by its inhabitants. Eliminating secondary access points to buildings,
moving furniture so those access points are more visible to school personnel, or
eliminating viewing obstructions are examples of increasing natural surveillance
(Schneider, 2010).
Access control pertains to determining who does and does not have access to your
school. To state the definition more simply, “The fewer the entry points, the less pressure
the school is under to try to staff them” (Schneider, 2010, Access Control section, para.
4). Access control also pertains to ensuring properly operating door and window
hardware is installed in the school. Though most access points should remain locked,
egress is also vital in the event of an emergency, and improperly operating door and
window hardware makes points more difficult to lock and unlock if an incident were to
occur (Schneider, 2010, Access Control section, para. 5).
The third concept addressed by Schneider (2010) is territoriality. Territoriality is
establishing clear boundaries that denote ownership. Proper signage that directs visitors
to the appropriate location is one example of territoriality. Fences, shrubbery, and
sidewalks also help establish the concept of territoriality by clearly defining appropriate
areas and ownership. To clearly establish territoriality, maintenance is critical because
“any unkempt part of the campus sends a message that no one is particularly concerned
about or possessive of that part of the school” (Schneider, 2010, Territoriality and
Maintenance section, para. 3).
Perceptions of Security
There is a balance that must be achieved in security enhancement implementation.
Dorn et al. (2014) reiterated a common idea prevalent in creating safe schools: Schools
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are places of learning, even after safety and security measures are implemented. A
positive school environment becomes a part of school security as the citizens of the
school community become more connected to the buildings (Dorn et al., 2014). As
pressure increases from random, targeted acts of violence in schools, the public and, at
times, government entities want to see security measures beefed up (Warnick et al.,
2018). Research tells us, however, that this may have a negative effect on those inside the
buildings.
Target hardening has the unintended effect of changing how teachers, students,
and administrators view one another, which has important consequences for educational
outcomes (Warnick et al., 2018). We have established that schools are places that should
facilitate learning; but as we design safety and security into our school buildings, we
must be careful not to inhibit the educational process while also reinforcing to the school
community that their safety is a priority (Dorn et al., 2014; Kennedy, 2003; Warnick et
al., 2018).
REMS (2018) noted that student perceptions of safety may be more impactful on
academic outcomes than actual safety. Utilizing measures that are nonintrusive (cameras,
locked doors) has less of an impact on achievement due to minimal interaction with
students (Perumean-Chaney & Sutton, 2013). A combination of layered security factors
may be more effective in reducing the potential for offenses to occur, but they also can
have the unintended consequence of making students feel less safe (Perumean-Chaney &
Sutton, 2013). As schools determine which measures to incorporate into their safety and
security planning, they must be careful not to design places where there becomes an
expectation of violence (Warnick et al., 2018). Fennelly and Perry (2014) more
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succinctly made this point by stating, “Students must be safe without feeling as if they are
in a prison” (p 14).
Theories of Security
Smith and Brooks (2013) asserted that the term “security” lacks the required body
of knowledge to be classified as a discipline. This is not attributable to a lack of
knowledge, per se, but to the fact that security is “cross-disciplined” and encompasses
knowledge from many different fields. Further, Smith and Brooks stated that the concept
of security has multiple definitions and is ever-evolving. Security is, by its nature, lacking
in theories due to the multi-faceted manners in which it is applied: personal,
organizational, national, and international (Smith & Brooks, 2013). The commonality in
security research is that it is a “human characteristic that is objective, perceived,
expected, and demanded by people” (Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 2), no matter the form in
which it is applied. A second admission is that it will involve the protection of some
asset, which is determined by the organizational level to which security is applied. The
idea of asset protection, according to Smith and Brooks, is the primary objective of
security. In its applicability to this program evaluation, the assets are primarily the
inhabitants of the school and school community as well as the tangible, though lesser,
assets of school and personal property.
A focus on the safety and security of individuals “is important for anyone
concerned with developing and using the human potential” (Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 9),
which, understandably, is a fundamental objective of educational institutions. Smith and
Brooks (2013) differentiated between the concepts of safety and security: Safety is an
internal threat (accident), while security is an external threat (attack). More succinctly
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stated, “Security is an outcome of risk” (Smith & Brooks, 2013, p. 10). For the purposes
of applying theory to an evaluation of the SCS safety and security program, the two terms
will be used to identify the same basic concept of students, staff, and the larger school
community being protected from harm, internal or external.
Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs applies well to the discussion of security
(McLeod, 2018; Smith & Brooks, 2013). This needs-based theory focuses on human
motivation and is broken down into five levels. The most basic level, physiological
needs, is required for survival (McLeod, 2018; Smith & Brooks, 2013). Without the basic
needs of food and water, for example, one simply cannot survive (McLeod, 2018; Smith
& Brooks, 2013). As a need is mostly fulfilled, people can move to the next level of the
hierarchy which, in this instance, is safety and security (McLeod, 2018; Smith & Brooks,
2013). Still considered a basic need by Maslow (McLeod, 2018), safety and security
include the concepts of order, law, and freedom from fear and the elements (McLeod,
2018; Smith & Brooks, 2013). As such, for human beings to progress through the last
three levels and achieve their fullest potential, their need for safety and security must be
satisfied (McLeod, 2018; Smith & Brooks, 2013).
During the 1990s, a new line of thought regarding human security developed out
of Europe–the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (CSSS). CSSS had existed for
several years prior, but most of the work produced during the early years was based on
military and international security. The 1990s refocused some of the work of CSSS
towards human security and helped form a significant basis for current security thought
(Lukas, 2016). Three primary questions determine “security reality,” according to CSSS:
(a) Whose security? (b) Security of which values? and (c) Security against what? The
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premise of the questions is to determine the asset or object being protected, what or how
it is being protected, and the potential threats that exist that could affect the asset (Lukas,
2016). The shortfall of CSSS is that it can identify what is to be protected but it fails to
provide solutions for how to protect the asset due to its foundation in protectionist
military policy (Lukas, 2016).
Risk theory was initially developed as part of the actuarial industry (Smith &
Brooks, 2013). Recent events, however, have provided the basis for risk theory to be
applied in reference to safety and security. The crux of risk theory states that the worst
possible risks should be identified and measures put in place to counter or prevent those
threats (Lukas, 2016; Smith & Brooks, 2013). Essentially, the focus of risk theory is to be
preventive and try to ensure the security event does not happen. The measures established
should protect and prevent harm to the asset; additionally, they should minimize the
negative impact on the asset in the event an action cannot be prevented (Lukas, 2016).
The size of the negative impact has a direct bearing on the significance of the threat and
the probability that it could occur (Lukas, 2016). By measuring the significance of the
negative impact as well as its probability, risk theory has helped form a sound basis for
modern safety and security theory by providing methods to assess the vulnerability of an
asset and establish measures by which the asset will be protected from harm (Lukas,
2016).
Tying in closely with risk theory, the theory of risk perception grew out of the
nuclear proliferation of the 1960s (Roeser, 2012). The fear of a devastating nuclear
attack, though minute in probability, created the opportunity for researchers to begin to
discern how society, both collectively and individually, viewed these threats (Gorman,
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2018; Roeser, 2012). The basis for research into risk perception is to determine how
people formulate and respond to risk (Gorman, 2018). Bialostok (2015) asserted that
humans are so predisposed to risk that they are subconsciously attempting to control for
the possibility of harm. Risk perception theory holds that there is an element of control
involved in how individuals and groups ascertain risk (Gorman, 2018; Ropeik, 2012).
Some risks are “catastrophic,” with immediate, devastating effects, while others are
“chronic,” spread out over time and less impactful as a whole (Ropeik, 2012).
Catastrophic risks are not under the control of those affected and have the potential to be
heavily covered by the media, which can certainly exacerbate the impact (Bodemer &
Gaissmeier, 2015; Roeser, 2012). An example cited by Bodemer and Gaissmeier (2015)
noted that far more people die from auto accidents than airline accidents; however, they
noted that people are often more fearful of airline accidents due to the amount of control
they have over their own automobiles and subsequent lack of control they can exercise
over an aircraft. Media coverage and the potential for high casualties, therefore,
predispose individuals to view airline travel as a greater risk. When the devastation from
a catastrophic event involves harm to children (school shootings), the risk is further
amplified (Ropeik, 2012). This program evaluation involves perceptions of security at
two rural high school campuses and the subsequent measures taken to mitigate risk.
Logically, the theory of risk perception will figure prominently in the baseline analysis
conducted herein.
Risk Perception Theory
A theory that affects the effectiveness of any security or safety program is Risk
Perception Theory. A relatively new theory that developed out of the nuclear
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proliferation of the 1960s (Gorman, 2018), Risk Perception Theory acknowledges the
social and cultural factors that play into how individuals and groups perceive risk or the
potential for risk (Bialostok, 2015; Slovic, 1987). The basis for Risk Perception Theory
lies in a set of beliefs or norms held by a particular group and the subsequent assumptions
that have been formed through association with that group (Bialostok, 2015). Therefore,
something that is perceived as dangerous and how much risk should be attributed to that
object or situation is a result of social learning (Bialostok, 2015).
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) argued that the perceived social construct of risk
is a social mechanism utilized by “elites” to maintain control over a group. Those things
that are determined to be dangerous by society will then manifest in smaller groups and
individuals as a means of behavior control and modification (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982). The result of the social construct of risk is that there ostensibly will be greater
social cohesion which, in turn, makes those deemed as not belonging easier to identify
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Bialostok (2015) added to this by stating that this social
construct will also reveal the value a given society places on certain behaviors and
priorities, whether they are physical or symbolic.
A result of this mode of social control is that what one society views as a risk or
dangerous may be entirely disregarded by another society (Bialostok, 2015; Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982). A significant factor in this mode of risk perception is that implicit
biases against other persons or events can develop out of the social construction of risk,
especially when the perception is relying on intuition and is not based on factual
information or data (Slovic, 1987). When new evidence is presented that contradicts or
counters previously held beliefs concerning risk, the initial perceptions held by the group
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or individual are not likely to change. Instead, the new information, regardless of
relevancy, is prone to be dismissed (Slovic, 1987).
A sector of risk perception research details the voluntary versus involuntary
characteristic of risk perception (Bialostok, 2015; Gorman, 2018; Slovic, 1987). To
reiterate, an example of voluntary versus involuntary is weighing the risk between riding
in an airplane versus driving a car. Statistically, driving a car is more hazardous, but
people tend to fear flying more than they fear driving (Bodemer & Gaissmeier, 2015).
The basis for this perception of risk is that driving is voluntary, and people can exercise
control over their vehicle; whereas flying, though voluntary, leaves little control to the
passengers (Bodemer & Gaissmeier, 2015; Gorman, 2018). Furthermore, the effects of a
plane crashing (high casualties) are far more catastrophic than those of a single vehicle,
which lends considerable weight to the perception (Gorman, 2018).
Slovic (1987) stated, “Some events make only small ripples; others make larger
ones” (p. 283). Slovic added that the challenge is to determine the characteristics of risk
events and learn how to manage the impacts of those events. Interestingly, Slovic further
elaborated that “there is wisdom as well as error in public attitudes and perceptions” (p.
285). By most definitions, risk includes the probability of an event happening multiplied
by the magnitude of the event; therefore, it is important to determine whether the
occupants of a given “society” are more concerned with the probability or the
consequence (Oltedal et al., 2004). Following is a detailed description of the factors that
determine risk perception, including the aforementioned factors, as determined by
Fischoff et al. (2000):


Voluntariness of Risk–Is the risk voluntary or involuntary
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Immediacy of Effect–Is the risk of death likely or immediate



Knowledge of Risk–Are the risks known by those being exposed



Knowledge of Risk–Are the risks known by the experts/science



Control Over Risk–To what extent can an individual or group avoid the risk



Newness–Is the risk new or is it familiar



Chronic–Will the risk be singular in effect or catastrophic



Common–Do people reasonably live with the risk or dread the risk



Severity of Consequences–How likely is it that the risk will be fatal

The social context of risk, the school grounds and facilities of two rural high
schools in this instance, constitutes a significant basis in the construct of perceptions
(Oltedal et al., 2004). Furthermore, trust is also a function of risk perception (Oltedal et
al., 2004). Regarding schools, the school community (students, staff, and their families)
assumes that those responsible for the well-being of the occupants have taken the
necessary steps to ensure each individual’s safety (Bliesner & Armes, 2017). The degree
to which they make this assumption is indicative of the level of trust placed in the
decision makers and, thus, will weigh into the perceptions demonstrated within this
research (Oltedal et al., 2004).
CPTED as Theory
The development of CPTED as a crime prevention model is significant as a
theory and will likewise form the basis for the SCS safety and security baseline program
evaluation being conducted. The underlying reason for this program evaluation–to
manage the ripples that emanate from risk within two specific high school environments–
is based solely on the perceptions of the inhabitants. The premise of CPTED, that taking
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certain actions can prevent crime, is indicative of theory due to the if/then nature of
CPTED principles; for example, IF security cameras are installed, THEN likely offenders
will be more hesitant to commit an act (Adler & Laufer, 2013). Therefore, the measures
implemented utilizing CPTED as theory will presumably affect the behavior of the
inhabitants and non-inhabitants. As a preventive measure used to deter crime, CPTED
intertwines the physical environment with the “organisms” within that environment and
theorizes that the design or structure of one will alter the actions of the other (Adler &
Laufer, 2013). Whereas most areas of law enforcement are a response to crime and the
measures taken are often temporary, CPTED as theory stipulates that design of the
environment will prevent crime (Armitage & Monchuk, 2017). Furthermore, as part of
the built environment, the measures taken will more likely be permanent (Armitage &
Monchuk, 2017).
A second theoretical perspective of CPTED as theory is that by taking steps to
alter the behavior of the offender, the behavior of the inhabitants will also be altered
(Adler & Laufer, 2013). As the inhabitants perceive they are in an increasingly safe
environment, CPTED theory states they will also take greater ownership in their
environment and, as a result, the opportunity for others to commit crimes is further
reduced (Armitage & Monchuk, 2017). Ownership, in terms of how the inhabitants view
their environment, creates another mode of surveillance as the inhabitants become more
protective of their area or location. In a recent study by Armitage and Monchuk (2017), a
survey of offenders demonstrated that surveillance, mechanical and human, was the most
significant deterrent in regard to why a particular place or item was not targeted.
The primary focus of CPTED theory is that by altering the built environment,
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offenders will be deterred. The secondary focus, altering the perceptions of the organisms
operating within the environment, is a logical extension of Risk Perception Theory and
demonstrates how closely related the two theories are. Based on the assertions of
Armitage and Monchuk (2017), the measures implemented through utilizing CPTED
principles, therefore, affect the perceptions of both the inhabitants and the offenders,
incorporating elements of each theory into the idea of security.
Parnaby (2006) cautioned that CPTED as theory distinguishes between “normal”
and “abnormal” users. To define the terms, Parnaby succinctly stated that normal users
are the ones who are desired in a space and abnormal users are those whose presence is
deemed less desirable. As such, perception plays a role because of the weight given to
personal opinion and the potential for discrimination (Parnaby, 2006). When CPTED
principles are utilized, Parnaby went on to rationalize that “one’s own risk becomes the
means by which individuals can fulfill their end of a crime prevention partnership” (p.
14). Regarding the perspectives of individuals, Parnaby added that the application of
CPTED plays a significant role in determining “what it means to be a responsible citizen”
(p. 16. As a theory, the implementation of CPTED is purported to deter and reduce crime
by impacting the perceptions of the inhabitants and the likely offenders.
CPTED first and foremost is a crime prevention strategy. As a theory, the
presumption of those utilizing CPTED strategies is that the steps taken will alter the
behavior or perceptions of those who come into contact with an enhanced location. NASP
(2013) asserted, “Effective school safety programs begin by identifying potential areas of
risk and implementing physical and psychological safety prevention measures” (p. 3).
The premise of the parallel investigation conducted herein was precisely that: to identify
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areas of the two school campuses that are effectively mitigating risk and to determine
areas in which improvement may be needed. As perceptions of the offenders and
inhabitants determine to a great extent how safe a space may be, the baseline program
evaluation conducted herein was based squarely on CPTED principles. Through
assessing natural surveillance, territoriality, and controlled access, this analysis gauges
the existence and likely effectiveness of how CPTED principles are being implemented.
Conclusion
A review of the literature indicates that the obvious measures of school
surveillance and security–more cameras, more SROs, and potentially metal detectors–
may not be the best avenues for enhancing the safety of school campuses. Prior research
analysis demonstrates they may have a detrimental effect on student well-being and fail
to reduce acts of aggression or antisocial behavior. The literature does, however,
demonstrate that planning and supervision are instrumental in making our campuses more
secure. Architectural and landscape design elements can be effective in helping to
monitor what the students are doing as well as assist in keeping tabs on others who are
coming and going from our campuses. The principles espoused through CPTED,
however, are effective and financially feasible first steps to take when it comes to
mitigating risk on our high school campuses (Schneider, 2010).
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction
The case study conducted for this research was qualitative in nature. “One of the
chief reasons for conducting a qualitative study is that the study is exploratory”
(Creswell, 2014, p. 61), which applies to this study because the research was looking for
descriptive information to form a baseline set of data for the safety and security program
for SCS. The qualitative feedback provided will inform and guide the district’s leaders as
they continue to implement the program. SCS wants their students to feel safe and secure
without the changes being oppressive, but most importantly, the district wants to
demonstrate to the school community that safety is a priority.
Logic Model for Case Study
The qualitative data obtained for this research is representative of a case study.
The purpose of doing a case study is to provide a snapshot in time to ask “how are we
doing” regarding safety and security planning while also highlighting areas in need of
improvement (Creswell, 2014). Creswell (2014) noted that case studies are often used as
an evaluation tool for a program, event, or person(s) due to the rich data that can be
provided. Themes emerged from the data that were interpreted by a review committee
and me, but the answers to “how are we doing” emerged from the committee’s and my
interpretations (Creswell, 2014).
This case study was conducted utilizing a logic model, which provided “a
graphical depiction of processes in real life that communicate the underlying assumptions
upon which an activity is expected to lead to a specific result” (McCawley, 2001, p. 1).
Another way of looking at a logic model is that it will describe a cause-effect relationship
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(McCawley, 2001), the effects not being determined until after the case study has been
conducted. The cause/effect relationship can also be depicted in a series of if/then
statements: IF security cameras are installed in school cafeterias, THEN the number of
lunchtime infractions will decrease.
According to the CDC (2018), using a logic model provides a “road
map” that demonstrates shared relationships between resources,
activities, outputs, and outcomes. In addition to the if/then statements
prevalent in the logic model, the CDC adds what/so what to the discourse;
this is “what” we are doing “so what” can we expect from those inputs and
actions. As an evaluation tool, the logic model is adaptable and versatile,
with a focus that can cover an entire organization, program, department,
or subgroup of any of the three (CDC, 2018).
As the logic model applies to the SCS safety and security program,
Figure 2 illustrates the process through which baseline data were
collected and evaluated. The safety and security plan for SCS is still in its
infancy, having only been seriously discussed since March 2018. Utilizing
CPTED concepts due to their efficiency and typically low cost (Sutton,
2016), SCS has adopted the goal of making the high schools as safe as they
can “reasonably” be. Grounded in CPTED principles, this is being
accomplished by taking preventive steps that


Restrict access to the campuses



Expand visual access to the campus and student body



Enhance electronic surveillance of the campus
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Figure 2
Logic Model for SCS Safety and Security Program

In instituting a safety and security program, the initial dilemma
facing SCS was a lack of data concerning the degree to which their two
high school campuses are safe. Even though the two schools being
assessed were initially constructed in 1967, this was the first assessment of
its kind for the school system in terms of rating multiple features of the
campus and determining how they contribute to or hinder school safety.
The instrument for the SCS baseline case study was the CSA. The survey,
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designed by the CDC, provides for the survey participants to evaluate the
natural and mechanical facets of school grounds regarding CPTED
principles. Landscaping (natural) and camera systems (mechanical) are
two examples of the many features the survey provided the opportunity to
assess. The evaluations are based on a Likert scale, with participants rating
features on a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being the highest agreement). Since no
investigation has been conducted since the initial construction of the
schools, the surveys provided baseline qualitative data to inform the
district of any potential needs, which should help guide the program
during its development and subsequent future implementation.

Participants
According to Edwards and Holland (2013), sampling in qualitative research is
driven by the nature and context of the study and, due to accessibility factors, unlikely to
be random. As such, the participants in this study were high school principals and the
assistant principals, administrative assistants at each school, respective SROs,
superintendent, assistant superintendent, director of secondary schools, maintenance
supervisor, and Safe Schools coordinator. Each respondent is a pivotal player in the
safety and security programs being established at the high schools, but they each
approach the state of the built environment from varying perspectives. Voluntary
participation was sought from the following individuals:


Principals and assistant principals–Intimate day-to-day
knowledge of the campuses, buildings, students, and personnel.



Superintendent and assistant superintendent–Vested interest in
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students and staff members being as safe as is reasonably
possible.


Director of secondary schools–A former principal at one of the
high schools, this individual also has a vested interest in students
and staff members being as safe as is reasonably possible.



SRO–As an integral part of the security at each of the high
schools, they also lend a unique perspective through their
professional training.



Administrative assistants–Unique perspective of safety and
security due to being an extension of the “eyes and ears” of each
campus as well as primary contact for the campus monitors.



Safe Schools coordinator–Responsible for designing, analyzing,
and monitoring security for the school system (cameras,
lockdown procedures, fire systems).



Maintenance supervisor–Chosen due to their acute knowledge of
the layout and infrastructure of each of the campuses.

The persons chosen to be administered the surveys were selected
based on the perspectives each brings to the table. Creswell (2014) stated
that qualitative research should be a “holistic account” that factors in
multiple perspectives and allows for a greater view of the issue to emerge.
As outlined above, the perspectives are diverse in their origination, but
their overarching goals should uniformly be the same–to provide a safe,
secure learning and working environment for students and staff without
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creating a fortress-like atmosphere.
Survey Methodology
With permission from the Institutional Review Board of GardnerWebb University, the superintendent of SCS, and the CDC, the CSA was
administered in two high schools, establishing a parallel investigation. It
bears noting that the two schools were not being compared; information
was gathered to inform only. The CSA was provided to the principal and
assistant principal(s) at each of the high schools and they provided
evaluations of their respective locations. Likewise, the SROs and
administrative assistants completed surveys only for the location in which
they work. The superintendent, assistant superintendent, director of
secondary schools, maintenance supervisor, and Safe Schools coordinator
completed two surveys, one for each school.
To eliminate bias, once the surveys were compiled and mean scores
determined based on the Likert scale ratings, a committee reviewed the
scores and Additional Observations sections to look for emerging themes
or trends. Known as inter-relater reliability (Creswell, 2014; Marques &
McCall, 2005), the committee was necessary to overcome any researcher
bias that may knowingly or unknowingly have been inserted into the
interpretation of the findings (Marques & McCall, 2005). Furthermore, the
committee served as a “solidification tool” for qualitative studies, making
the findings more generalizable (Marques & McCall, 2005). As raters of the
survey instrument and the evaluations gleaned from the surveys, inter-
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raters help establish validity for both due to having no other obvious
connections to the evaluation (Marques & McCall, 2005).

The primary instrument–reflective of the process in a logic model evaluation–for
this study was the 2017 CDC CSA. Using a Likert scale, the assessment makes
statements about multiple features of the campuses and the respondents answered in a
range of 1 to 5, with 1 being the lowest level of agreement with the statement. There are
also two options for answering questions that are not scalable: Does Not Exist and
Unable to Observe. For example, there is a question on the CSA regarding bike racks,
which do not exist at SCS high schools; therefore, the respondent would answer with
Does Not Exist. A teacher who has supervisory duties in the courtyard may not be privy
to observing student drop-off and pickup at the schools. Since the teacher knows these
activities exist but may not be able to directly observe them, they would respond Unable
to Observe to the questions asking about those procedures. The CSA also provides an
area titled Additional Observations wherein the respondents could elaborate further on
topics or items that may require clarification or simply to note observations they feel
were not adequately covered through the assessment.
The CSA is a tool designed to measure agreement with statements pertaining to
school campuses. The assessment provides statements based on CPTED principles
outlined in Figure 1 and also includes a glossary of terms to assist the respondents with
clarification when necessary. There are nine categories assessed by the CSA:
1. Initial Impressions–statements to register your very first, overall impression of
the grounds, buildings, and interiors.
2. The Grounds–statements pertaining to the outside areas of the school property
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such as parking, student pickup/drop-off, and athletic areas.
3. The Buildings–statements pertaining to the physical parts of the building you
can see from the outside such as entryways, windows, and doors.
4. The Interiors–statements pertaining to the space inside a building or buildings
such as classrooms, corridors, and public areas.
5. Global Impressions–statements pertaining to the overall atmosphere or
ambiance of the school to be completed after the physical assessment has been
completed.
6. Additional Observations–an area to register any observations of the physical
environment which has not been adequately covered in the assessment.
7. Surrounding Land Use–a list of land uses adjacent to the school property; i.e.,
properties observable from the school grounds.
8. Surrounding Land Use Condition–the same list of land uses to be rated for the
overall physical conditions.
9. Assessment Day Information–notations regarding date, time, weather, and any
unique factors that might affect observation fidelity.
Sections 7 and 8 of the CSA were omitted for the purposes of this survey because
both schools are located in heavily rural areas and are surrounded by farmlands and
sparse housing density. To address the intended purpose of this study, “Are our high
school campuses safe,” we focused on the first six sections of the survey, which address
the immediate school grounds and buildings inside the defined school perimeters, while
still providing sections for additional respondent observations. In addition to omitting the
aforementioned sections, the remaining sections (1-6) were modified to eliminate
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statements with no applicability to the subject high schools. For example, Section 1
makes statements pertaining to exterior ramps, stairs, or balconies. Since only one of
these three conditions exists at the respective high schools, questions pertaining to those
obviously nonexistent physical characteristics were removed from the survey to eliminate
the possibility of confusion.
Once the CSA was administered to the participants, the scaled responses were
tabulated for mean scores in the aggregate and combined. The statements provided in the
CAS are measured with a Likert scale and, as such, the responses were coded 1-5 based
on participant agreement with the statement. The mean scores were then measured
against a range proposed by the CDC, the survey’s author. According to the CDC, the
ranges are “general,” but their guidelines for interpretation are as follows:
● Ratings of 1-2 are unacceptable and note items that need attention.
● Ratings of 3 are acceptable but may need scrutiny.
● Ratings of 4-5 are compliant with CPTED principles and do not warrant
further attention.
In accordance with using the CSA and to promote ongoing research concerning
school safety, aggregated responses from the survey will be provided to the CDC.
Interview Methodology
The review committee had two goals: interpret the responses to
look for elements of safety and security that are performed well by the
school district and to look for areas of need. Once these two themes were
established, each of the survey respondents was interviewed to allow them
to develop their responses further. Since an essential piece of qualitative
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research is that it normally takes place in a natural setting (Creswell, 2014),
it was critical for this evaluation that the surveys were completed on site.
In turn, the respondents were provided with the opportunity to elaborate,
above and beyond the survey questions and scales, on those things they
were able to observe in each setting. Their responses were recorded, but
notes were also taken during the interviews.

An analysis of the survey results may reveal anomalies in the data which,
presumably, would be measures performed well and those in need of improvement. Since
the survey is utilizing a Likert scale, to fully develop the areas in need of improvement, it
proved beneficial to interview the participants to gain more insight into the ratings. To
ensure reliability between the survey responses and details elicited through the
interviews, member checking was utilized by providing the respondents with a copy of
their survey responses before the interview being conducted.
The interview method utilized for this study was open questioning, which allowed
the interviewees to express or elaborate “in their own words” the reasoning behind their
ratings (McLeod, 2014). Assumptions may be made from the Likert scale ratings, but the
intent of the study was to determine how well the district is administering its safety and
security program as well as to find areas in need of improvement. To effectively
determine next steps for the program, it was necessary also to gain a deeper
understanding of participant responses, which was achieved through open questioning
(McLeod, 2014).
In reviewing the data gathered through the CSA, an outlier is a score that was
more than 2 points from a subcategory or statement-of-agreement mean. Due to the semi-
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structured nature of the interview, there are questions that were asked, but they were
based on the Likert scores from the survey, as explained above. Utilizing semi-structured
questions also allowed me to better understand the perspectives and experiences of the
respondents (Balbach, 1999). Since the nature of the case study being conducted was to
determine what is being done well and what the district could do better, the questions
followed a basic protocol:


Based on your score of __x__ for (sub)category, what factors prompted or
influenced your thinking?



Based on your score of __x__ for (sub)category, in which area(s) do you think
safety and security can be improved?



What specific steps would you recommend to improve safety and security?

(The first three questions are focused on outliers in survey responses and will be
repeated based on the number of high and low outliers identified in the
responses.)


Do you have any concerns about campus safety and security that were not
addressed in the survey that you would like to address now?

Being qualitative in nature, this study sought to describe the state of the existing
safety and security program at two high schools. To best obtain these qualitative data,
detailed descriptions were necessary to develop the basis for the survey scores. As stated
by Alshenqeeti (2014), conducting interviews will “broaden the scope of understanding
investigated phenomena” (p. 40) and provide more natural data. A second benefit of
using interviews is that they may uncover information not addressed or accessible in the
surveys (Alshenqeeti, 2014). The interviews should provide a second set of data
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that can then be introduced to the review committee for solidification. It

also bears noting that inter-raters must be cautious in interpreting information garnered
through interviews because, if interpreted incorrectly, it could alter the validity and
reliability of the program evaluation being conducted (Alshenqeeti, 2014). To eliminate
researcher bias and to follow COVID-19 safety protocol, the interviews were not
conducted in my physical presence.
Following transcription, the review committee looked for themes that emerged
from the interviews. For this to take place, the committee used index cards to note any
statements they deemed to be impactful or otherwise noteworthy. Whether positive,
negative, or neutral, these statements were then grouped based on the CSA category or
subcategory to which they applied. A separate grouping was set up to cover additional
observations that were not accounted for within the framework of the survey. After a
thorough review, the findings were presented as an integral part of the safety and security
program evaluation for SCS.
Each of the interviewees was notified in writing of their voluntary participation
for the survey, standard protocol for subject protection; however, their consent was also
requested verbally at the start of the interview and recorded as part of the transcription.
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Document Review Methodology
Creswell (2014) noted that conducting a document review can often provide a
researcher with valuable “evidence” that is already written. As such, a review of meeting
minutes from SCS Board of Education meetings was carried out. Meeting minutes can be
a vital source of information if they are articulated well and occur in open sessions;
however, Creswell is also careful to note that document review can be made difficult due
to potentially limited public access, as would be the case with closed-session school
board meeting minutes. The SCS Board of Education meeting minutes are available
online and were downloaded from the district’s website.
The document review also included district-wide leadership meetings, which are
held once a month and attended by school-based administrators and central office
directors. These meetings are led by the superintendent and assistant superintendent and
include directors, principals, and assistant principals. Leadership meeting minutes are not
available online, but they are available upon request. The minutes from the SCS Board of
Education meetings and district leadership meetings were reviewed by me and the review
committee for statements and information relevant to the case study.
The document review is essential for establishing a stated need from the school
district. Safety and security needs are typically addressed by local funding and the
occasional grant. It is imperative through the document review, combined with the
program evaluation, to develop themes regarding the current state of the safety and
security program as well as to reinforce the future direction of the program, make
recommendations for future enhancements, and determine appropriate funding levels for
the program.
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Data Analysis Methodology
Using the Likert ratings from the CSA, themes and trends emerged from the data
concerning the immediate state of the safety and security program. Once analyzed, the
trend data presented as part of this case study helped guide planning for implementation
of the CPTED principles established as part of the original SCS safety and security
program. In addition to those functions being performed well, short-term and long-range
safety and security planning will benefit from the themes that emerged.
The survey responses were coded using the major categories, broken down by
subcategories, further evaluated by statements of agreement within the subcategories, and
then broken down by mean. Once mean scores were determined, the emerging themes
were then divided based on the three levels established by the CSA: unacceptable,
acceptable but needing scrutiny, and compliant. Categories and subcategories that
perform in the 1-3 range were the primary focus of the interview questions. Likewise, if a
subcategory had an overall acceptable score but one of the respondents scored it in the
unacceptable range, that specific subcategory or statement of agreement score also bore
out in the interview process. This is an example of the scoring outliers the review
committee was looking for in interpreting the results, but these outliers weighed heavily
in establishing the themes addressed in the interviews.
After the surveys were administered, Likert scores were tabulated and grouped
based on mean scores and CDC guidelines for score interpretation: Ratings of 1-2 are
unacceptable; ratings of 3 are acceptable but may need scrutiny; ratings of 4-5 are
compliant with CPTED principles. Creswell (2014) stated that text data from qualitative
studies are so voluminous that it is not possible to use them all when reporting findings.
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Therefore, it becomes necessary to “winnow” the data; the data from the CSA were
“chunked” by survey category:


Initial impressions



Grounds



Buildings



Interiors



Global impressions



Additional observations

Each of the above categories contains subcategories within which the chunks
were further broken down based on subcategories and statements of agreement. For
example, Interiors may have a mean score of 4.2, which would indicate overall
compliance with CPTED principles. However, within Interiors is a subcategory for
Access Control to Administrative Offices. If, for example, Access Control to
Administrative Offices was to have a mean score of 2.2, indicating it is not acceptable
and warrants further scrutiny, it became a subcategory that needed to be investigated
through the interview process.
Outcomes
The primary outcome for the SCS in conducting the program evaluation was to
establish a baseline set of data to inform the safety and security program. The survey
attempted to identify facets of security the district is adequately performing as well as to
identify shortcomings in the program. A third facet of the baseline data that were
compiled is that the district may also uncover areas or characteristics of the program that
have been overlooked altogether. The baseline data that were compiled, regardless of
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strengths and weaknesses, should provide direction for the SCS safety and security
program in short- and long-range safety planning.
As an evaluation instrument, the CSA is a thorough evaluation instrument in
terms of identifying and assessing features and principles dictated by environmental
design security planning. Through the program evaluation for SCS, it is hopeful that the
district can utilize the results to enhance or alter facets of its own safety and security
program to make it more effective. Furthermore, the data could be used to make
recommendations to other schools or districts regarding effective and minimally invasive
CPTED planning and implementation.
Limitations and Delimitations of the Study
It bears noting that the scores compiled from the survey were not compared
between schools. The primary purpose of the case study that was conducted was to
determine if the two high schools are perceived to be safe, not to determine if one is safer
than the other. Since there is no comparison between the two schools, the evaluation is a
parallel investigation and is representative of two different sets of exploratory
information, with the results of the research relayed as such.
Nine respondents completed surveys for each school. Four respondents completed
only a survey for EHS and four respondents completed surveys solely for WHS. The
respondents who completed single-school surveys were the school-based administrators,
administrative assistants, and SROs at each location. District-level staff–superintendent,
assistant superintendent, director of secondary schools, maintenance supervisor, and Safe
Schools coordinator–completed surveys for both schools. A greater number of

respondents would have added weight to the conclusions drawn from the survey;
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however, due to the length and depth of the survey, involving respondents who lacked
prior knowledge of the campuses would have been cumbersome and inordinately timeconsuming for the individuals involved.
In determining next steps and possibilities for future research, it is important to
convey that the information gleaned from the case study involved two different
evaluations. Attempts to replicate the findings to other schools or settings will not be
valid and will require their own site-specific evaluations and interpretations. Furthermore,
this study measured the perceptions of safety and security on two campuses, as
determined by the observations and scaled scores provided by staff and district leaders.
As such, there was no determination being made as to actual safety that exists on either
campus.
Permissions
Permission to conduct the research described herein was requested from the
Institutional Review Board at Gardner-Webb University and the superintendent of SCS.
As participants in the evaluation, the principals were notified of the evaluations and their
participation was requested. Per the CDC, no permissions are necessary to use the CSA
(see Appendix A). Once the requisite permissions were granted, the survey respondents
were provided a consent form with the following conditions (Creswell, 2014):


Participation is voluntary and no compensation will be provided.



They may withdraw from the study at any time.



A clear outline of the study’s purpose and how the data will be collected.



The responses will remain confidential, and any data will be de-identified.



They will be notified of potential risks, if any, associated with the study.
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Potential benefits of the study.

Once these items were in place, the CSA was administered to the participants.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
For school districts that are dealing with tight financial resources, the

applicability of this case study to other persons or groups is broad. For the 2016-2017
school year, the state in which the two high schools are located ranked 39th nationally in
per-pupil spending, $2,300 below the national average. The county in which the two high
schools are located has a property tax rate of $.66 per $100 of assessed value, ranking
43rd lowest of the state’s 100 counties. The capital outlay budget for the entire district,
encompassing almost 1,000,000 square feet, in which the two schools are located was
$240,000 for 2017-2018 and $256,000 for 2018-2019. These figures are all important
because school funding is less than ideal in many states and school districts. Fewer funds
mean school facilities are having to do more with less, and this includes updating security
and safety features at aging school facilities (Larkin & Matson, 2016).
Security features can be designed into new buildings: controlled access or singleentry buildings, state-of-the-art closed-circuit cameras and internet access, ample natural
lighting, and windows. However, when the buildings were designed for a time in which
these same characteristics were not as important, providing a safe, secure academic
environment for students and staff can be expensive and burdensome (Larkin & Matson,
2016). Physical design plays a pivotal role in campus security, and 50-plus-year-old
spaces are not always compatible with 2020 concerns or needs (Larkin & Matson, 2016).
Overall trends for school crime and violence are declining, but districts still must prepare
for situations that were not of significant concern 50 years ago (Kennedy, 2016; NIJ,
2017). The concern for SCS is designing enhancements that can utilize the facilities as
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they currently exist without creating a fortress-like atmosphere for students and staff.
Many of the environmental and CPTED principles being implemented for the
schools that are central to this study are based on increasing adult supervision by creating
opportunities for adults to be able to see more space. Over 90% of U.S. public high
schools have installed closed-circuit cameras (Musu-Gillette et al., 2018), but cameras
mostly serve as a record of an event that has already occurred (Schwartz et al., 2016).
Cameras demonstrate to the school community that steps are being taken to enhance
security; however, they do little else to increase the perception of safety for students
(Perumean-Chaney & Sutton, 2013).
Context of the Study
The context for this study is two rural high schools in northwest North Carolina.
The schools were constructed on virtually identical footprints, and both opened in the
same year, 1967. The reason these two schools were chosen for this study is that they
both are built on an open concept with multiple buildings around a central courtyard.
Although in a rural setting that is predominantly agricultural in use, the array of buildings
on each campus can also be accessed through multiple points around the perimeter. The
nature of any high school campus–age of students, class changes, freedom of movement–
presents challenges; when the buildings, parking areas, main offices, and athletics
facilities are aged and spread out, the challenges are magnified. A program specific to the
two high schools and that focuses on enhancing inhabitant perceptions of safety and
security is at the core of this case study.
Through utilization of the CDC CSA, the CPTED School Conditions Audit
(hereinafter, Audit; Appendix F), CSA respondent interviews, and document review, I
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attempted to answer the following questions:
1. Based on the principles of CPTED, how safe are the two high school
campuses?
2. Based on CPTED principles, in what areas (mechanical or natural) is SCS
adequately implementing an effective safety and security program?
3. Based on CPTED principles, in what areas (mechanical or natural) does SCS
need to improve its safety and security program?
By answering these questions, I determined what SCS is doing well, identified areas in
which improvement was needed, and ascertained any additional measures that could
enhance the overall perception of safety on the two campuses. It is worth noting that the
safety and security program being evaluated is a program that is designing preventive
measures–based squarely on CPTED principles–into the school facilities and is not in
response to an incident or event.
Instruments
To conduct the case study, two surveys were administered: the CSA and the
CPTED Audit. The impetus behind conducting separate surveys was to provide two sets
of data that could be compared and contrasted against each other. Reingle Gonzalez et al.
(2016) pointed out that students and staff often differ in their perceptions of security,
actual and perceived. Warnick et al. (2018) also argued that perceptions of security affect
workplace satisfaction for adults, while also having an impact on academic and socialemotional outcomes for students. Both viewpoints lend themselves to establishing
baseline data from which SCS can continue to implement and improve upon their
existing safety and security program. Therefore, two sets of data from which to work are
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seemingly invaluable for this study.
The CSA was administered to the adults participating in the case study.
Individuals in similar roles at each school completed a survey for their respective school,
while district-level leaders completed surveys for both schools. Once survey results were
analyzed for responses more than two points from the mean, as well as those factors that
were rated favorably or poorly, interviews were conducted with each of the respondents
to better understand the rationale behind their responses. The principal for EHS is notably
absent from Table 3. Approximately 2 months before survey administration, I became the
principal at EHS, and the former principal moved to the district office as the director of
secondary schools. For a distribution of the surveys, refer to Table 3.
Table 3
Distribution of CSA for SCS

EHS
Asst. principal
Asst. principal
School resource officer
Administrative asst.

CSA participants
EHS and WHS
Superintendent
Asst. superintendent
Director of secondary schools
Maintenance supervisor
Safe Schools coordinator

WHS
Principal
Asst. principal
School resource officer
Administrative asst.

The CPTED Audit was administered anonymously to former students from each
school. Students solicited were 2019 and 2020 graduates. These students were solicited
based on their time of attendance being before and during implementation of the SCS
safety and security program. Solicitations were placed on district and school social media
sites. Initially seeking a total of 50 respondents, 70 surveys were completed: 27 surveys
for EHS and 43 for WHS. Ironically, EHS, which garnered significantly fewer
respondents, has an enrollment that is approximately 33% greater than WHS year to year.
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After the data were compiled in summary form, a review committee analyzed the
ratings and comments from the CSA and the CPTED Audit. The review committee was
comprised of two retired teachers, one from each school, with firsthand knowledge of the
layout and identifying characteristics of each campus. A current district employee with
knowledge of the safety and security plan but lacking decision-making responsibilities
also participated in the review committee. The role of the review committee was to
analyze the data for common themes, contradictory statements or ratings, or any other
information that may appear anomalous or otherwise pertinent.
COVID-19 Protocol
It bears noting that the research described in Chapter 4 occurred during the
COVID-19 pandemic. EHS and WHS opened the school year in August 2020 operating
under Plan B as set forth by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human
Services (NCDHHS, 2020). The guidance from NCDHHS was issued initially in June
2020 and remained a living document, with the most recent update as of this writing
being March 24, 2021. Referred to as the Strong Schools NC Public Health Toolkit, the
publication provided public schools with recommendations and best practices for
navigating the 2020-2021 pandemic-related school year.
EHS and WHS both opened under Plan B, which directed schools to utilize inperson instruction with classroom capacities based on a predetermined number of
students per 1,000 square feet. Both high schools opened for in-person instruction in
August 2020 while operating under a cohort plan. Students with last names beginning
with A-K were considered A cohort, and last names L-Z were placed in the B cohort. The
A cohort attended school on Monday and Tuesday of each week, Wednesdays were
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remote learning days for all students, and the B cohort attended school on Thursday and
Friday. Additionally, a virtual option was added for the district’s high schools. This was
done to accommodate families or students who did not feel safe returning to school.
Roughly 20% of the district’s high school students chose the virtual option.
Operating under Plan B with limited capacities, best practices from the NCDHHS
Strong Public Schools Toolkit were also implemented. Among these safety and sanitation
procedures were


Temperature screening for all persons entering campus



Screening questions or attestations for all persons entering campus



Mandatory mask-wearing for all persons on campus



Social distancing of at least 6 feet between persons in all areas of the campus



Sanitizing of high contact surfaces between class periods and at the end of
each school day



Fogging of all classrooms, hallways, restrooms, and office spaces each
Tuesday and Friday afternoon



Students eating prepackaged meals in classrooms



Installation of hand sanitizing stations at each entry/exit on campus

The above list is not all-inclusive, but it is offered to provide a reference point for
how the two high schools were operating daily. The results as reported in Chapter 4 were
compiled while the above protocols, and more, were instituted at each high school. The
Plan B protocols were referenced in some of the comments made by the adults, either
during interviews or as additional observations, but any impact on the ratings themselves
is unknown at this time. It also bears noting that during the administration of the surveys
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and while conducting interviews, each high school incurred a closure due to COVID-19
clusters being identified at the schools. One of the closures emanated from students, the
other from adults.
Survey Responses
The primary question to be answered in this case study is how safe are the two
high schools? To measure the degree of safety, the CDC (2017) recommended the
following guidelines in analyzing the results of the CSA:
● Ratings of 1-2 are unacceptable and note items that need attention
● Ratings of 3 are acceptable but may need scrutiny
● Ratings of 4-5 are compliant with CPTED principles and do not warrant
further attention
There are five major categories, each comprised of subcategories. The
subcategories are further broken down into 28 specific areas or subjects. Each of those
areas contains statements of agreement that are measured using a Likert scale, rating each
statement 1 (lowest level of agreement) through 5 (highest level of agreement). The
scores shown in Table 4 are mean scores derived from the statements of agreement for
that particular line item. Overall, there are 267 individual statements of agreement
throughout the survey, the number of statements varying by subcategory and subject area.
Since a Likert scale is used to measure attitudes or perceptions, determining the
“distance” between intervals is not exact but will still provide the reader with the
necessary information for capturing the overall concept (Sullivan & Artino, 2013). We
will discuss some of the more specific statements as we work through the results to
determine those things the schools are doing well and areas that need attention.
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The scores for each high school are listed in Table 4. The overall mean for each
school–3.56 for EHS and 3.57 for WHS–demonstrates that safety and security
implementation is acceptable; what is difficult to determine with the Likert scale is how
much scrutiny the scores warrant. Among the scores in Table 4, only three categories at
WHS scored 4 or better–Bus Unloading and Loading, Courtyard, and Cafeteria and Food
Courts; there were no categories at EHS that scored 4 or better. In contrast, neither school
had a mean categorical score below 3.09 (Buildings: Entries and Exits), with both schools
scoring their lowest mean in the same category. Based simply on the CDC’s scoring
guidelines, every category for both schools is, at the least, minimally acceptable
according to CPTED recommendations. There are outliers among the statements of
agreement, and we will address those later in the results.
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Table 4
Summary Mean Scores by (Sub)Category/School
CSA Category Descriptions with Mean Scores

EHS
Mean
3.81

WHS
Mean
3.75

A. Grounds: Perimeter (6 SOA)

3.38

3.4

B. Ground: Points of Entry (6 SOA)

3.67

3.27

C. Grounds: Parent Drop-off/Pickups (9 SOA)

3.85

3.86

D. Grounds: Bus Unloading and Loading (8 SOA)

3.85

4.02

E. Grounds: Vehicular Routes (4 SOA)

3.7

3.86

F. Grounds: Parking Areas (10 SOA)

3.46

3.5

G. Grounds: Exterior Pedestrian Pathways and Gathering Areas (13 SOA)

3.45

3.75

H. Grounds: Exterior Athletic Areas (4 SOA)

3.19

3.16

I. Grounds: Other (5 SOA)

3.16

3.31

J. Grounds: General (16 SOA)

3.61

3.83

3.53

3.6

A. Building(s): Entries and Exits (9 SOA)

3.09

3.09

B. Building(s): Exterior Walls (6 SOA)

3.54

3.71

C. Building(s): Courtyards (7 SOA)

3.65

4.09

D. Building(s): General (8 SOA)

3.47

3.28

3.44

3.54

A. Interior: Main/Visitor Lobby (13 SOA)

3.55

3.64

B. Interior: Student Entry Areas - Other Than Main Lobby (12 SOA)

3.27

3.44

C. Interior: Administrative Offices (8 SOA)

3.44

3.43

D. Interior: Corridors (14 SOA)

3.44

3.31

E. Interior: Restrooms (12 SOA)

3.57

3.6

F. Interior: Classrooms (10 SOA)

3.67

3.92

G. Interior: In-school Suspension Areas (3 SOA)

3.71

3.42

H. Interior: Cafeteria(s) and Food Courts (15 SOA)

3.92

4

Initial Impressions (4 Statements of Agreement [SOA])
The Grounds

Grounds Mean Score
The Buildings

The Buildings Mean Score
The Interiors

(cont.)
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CSA Category Descriptions with Mean Scores
I. Interior: Auditorium(s) (4 SOA)

EHS
Mean
3.92

WHS
Mean
3.41

J. Interior: Gymnasium (6 SOA)

3.96

3.84

K. Interior: Locker Rooms (Men/Boys) (11 SOA)

3.29

3.31

L. Interior: Locker Rooms (Women/Girls) (11 SOA)

3.2

3.17

M. Interior: Libraries and Media Centers (8 SOA)

3.95

3.86

N. Interior: General (21 SOA)

3.55
3.6
3.55
3.56

3.5
3.56
3.28
3.57

The Interiors Mean Score
Global Impressions (4 SOA)
TOTAL MEAN SCORE

It has been noted throughout this study that the two high schools are very similar.
They are in rural settings; they are open-concept designs with multiple buildings around a
central courtyard; building layout and footprint are common (not identical); and both
opened in 1967. Likewise, of the highest-rated categories for each high school, four of
those categories are shared:


Parent Drop-off/Pickups (3.85 EHS / 3.86 WHS)



Bus Unloading and Loading (3.85 EHS / 4.025 WHS)



Cafeteria and Food Courts (3.92 EHS / 4 WHS)



Libraries and Media Centers (3.95 EHS / 3.86 WHS)

The exceptions to shared characteristics among the highest-rated categories are
Gymnasium and Auditorium (3.96 and 3.92 respectively) at EHS. For WHS, Courtyards
and Classrooms (4.09 and 3.92 respectively) are the two standalone categories with high
mean scores. As pointed out by a member of the review committee, it is interesting to
note that the categories receiving the highest scores are the same areas in which there is
often a high density of students; the adults rating these areas hold the perception that
these areas are among the most orderly and easiest to observe on the two campuses.
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As with the highest-rated categories, the two high schools also share lowest-rated
categories. The schools share three categories that were among the lowest-scoring:


Exterior Athletics Areas (3.19 EHS / 3.16 WHS)



Entries and Exits (3.09 EHS / 3.09 WHS)



Locker Rooms (Women/Girls; 3.2 EHS / 3.17 WHS)

Separately, the lowest-scoring categories for each school that were not shared are Points
of Entry (3.27) and Global Impressions (3.28) for WHS and (Grounds) Other (3.16) and
Student Entry Areas–Other Than Main Lobby (3.27) for EHS. The review committee did
not find any immediate commonalities between these areas other than to note that these
areas may be more difficult to supervise, mechanically or naturally. Though the scores
are still higher than 3 and Likert scales do not clearly define the interval, the review
committee asserts that ratings closer to 3 are moderately acceptable but certainly merit
more scrutiny than those closer to 4.
Detailed CSA Results
The mean scores listed in Table 4 reflect the mean scores for the subcategories of
the CSA. For each of the subcategories listed, there are statements of agreement that are
scored on the Likert scale. The mean score listed for the subcategory is a total mean score
based on the Likert ratings for each individual statement of agreement within the specific
subcategory. In this section, we will delve into the ratings for individual statements of
agreement that are reflective of aspects of the safety and security program in need of
significant attention (< 3). We will address the inadequate statements of agreement in the
order in which they appear in the survey. They are listed (in bold font) by Category:
Subcategory, followed by the statement number from the CSA, the actual statement of
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agreement, and the mean score for the statement. As relayed below, the high school
findings will be discussed per school, not summarily.
EHS
Grounds: Perimeter–7.4. The perimeter is secured in areas not easily
monitored. Mean score–2.67. Mentioned several times throughout this case study, both
high school campuses are in rural settings; they are surrounded by woods, farmland, and
sparse housing. Scoring a 2.67, this mean indicates there is improvement needed in
securing the perimeter of the EHS campus. As shown in Appendix C, the buildings are
central to the property with ample land surrounding the campus. Other than the campus
monitor near the primary entrance and a mobile SRO, there is little else to warn the
inhabitants of an intruder. As noted by an assistant principal in the Additional
Observations, “EHS is a safe place because of the community environment and people. A
determined person could arrive on our campus unannounced and wreak havoc for a short
time. We have plans in place to stop someone once identified.”
Securing secondary vehicular entrances only prevents vehicles from entering the
campus; it does not limit foot traffic. The athletics fields are largely secured by fencing,
but the rest of the campus is accessible from the road or woods around campus. As noted
by the adult and student respondents, the woods around the campus provide cover if there
were to be a need to escape, but they also provide an opportunity for a foot-borne intruder
to enter campus.
A second factor impacting this mean, and noted by most of the respondents, is
that the campus design allows for viewing of the central courtyard, but the areas outside
the building perimeter are obscured by woods or a lack of windows. As stated by the
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director of secondary schools, “These schools were built in the 1960s when surveillance
and overall facility safety was not a primary concern.” Another assistant principal
remarked starkly, “EHS is an open campus with entry from all sides.”
Grounds: Parent Drop-off/Pickups–16.1. Parent drop-off/pickup locations
are clearly marked by signage, pavement, and curb treatments. Mean score–2.78.
Based on the statement of agreement, none of the details outlined exist at EHS. There is a
years-long “habit,” according to an assistant principal, but there are no other markers.
The COVID-19 pandemic altered these procedures temporarily, but with the return of
students to campus full-time on April 6, 2021, the old “habit” procedure for drop-off and
pickup returned.
Grounds: Parking Areas–46.10. Visitor parking areas are visible from
adjacent buildings. Mean score–2.56. The highest Likert score for this statement of
agreement was 5, with the most common (frequency) being 3. If not for the single 5, the
mean score would have been considerably lower. When the adults were interviewed
about this statement, to summarize, they responded that the parking was in the front of
the campus and the administrative offices were in the rear of the campus. Only when
visitors eschew designated parking do they park at the rear of campus in a relatively
visible area. The maintenance supervisor added that the visitor parking is beside the
building located furthest from the main office, noting specifically that visitors are
“walking through the whole campus to get to the administrative offices.”
Grounds: Exterior Pedestrian Pathways and Gathering Areas–58.12. Public
telephones are located in areas that are easily monitored. Mean score–1.75. This was
the lowest score of the 266 statements of agreement, and understandably so. Being a rural
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campus, public telephones are not something the review committee believed anyone
would expect at either of the high school campuses. The frequency was Does Not Exist,
but the representation of “public” telephone is what does not currently exist. There is one
publicly accessible phone, and it is located in the main office.
Grounds: Exterior Pedestrian Pathways and Gathering Areas–48.2. There is
a wayfinding system which includes signs; plant materials; and artwork,
monuments, or other landmarks. Mean score–2.57; 62.3. Posted rules are located
near exterior athletic area entries and exits. Mean score–2.89. At the time the surveys
were administered, the school system was operating under the governor’s Plan B for
North Carolina public schools–capacity based on classroom/venue square footage, masks,
sanitizing, social distancing–and the survey respondents noted that much of what they
saw around campus was COVID-19-related. One assistant principal noted that the
signage, as observed, was “heavily influenced by COVID protocol.” The SRO offered a
more objective view:
The signs that we do have do not stick out or get the attention of people. They are
also small in size. The marquee that is at the front of the school is bland and is
blocked by trees and the fence line.
Grounds: Other–64.1. Access to dumpsters is controlled. Mean score–2.67;
There are no hiding places in or around dumpster areas. Mean score–2.22. As noted
earlier, there are ample woods on and surrounding the EHS campus. The dumpsters are
located next to a building but also on the edge of the woods. Behind the dumpsters are a
set of steps that lead down a steep wooded hill. The maintenance supervisor noted these
items in his interview, adding that there is no way to see anyone coming from the woods
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in that direction because the “dumpsters also obscure the view of the woods behind
them.” This was seconded by an assistant principal who remarked that there is no
sightline into that section of woods due to the dumpster locations.
Grounds: General–69.1. The organization of the school campus is easily
comprehended. Mean score–2.89. As previously stated by the director of secondary
schools, little sense can be made from the design of the campus. He remarked that the
campus was constructed at a time when priorities were different, adding that it is
“essentially impossible” to secure either of the high school campuses “because of the
layout.” Further, the SRO observed that the building interiors “present a tactical
nightmare if there was an active shooter” (rectangular hallways, electrical/storage rooms
and restrooms inside the rectangle, classrooms outside the rectangle). Regardless of
where you stand in the original classroom buildings, two of the four hallways will be
entirely obscured from anyone’s view.
Grounds: General–77.9. The grounds are easily viewed from school
buildings. Mean score–2.89. Addressed previously with general statements about the
campus perimeter, the SRO noted that seven of the nine buildings on campus do not have
any windows that face the perimeter of the campus. The assistant superintendent also
remarked that of the few windows that do open to the perimeter, many of them are
obscured by blinds that remain closed at all times. According to the respondents, the only
readily viewed area is the courtyard, which the review committee presumes to have been
the focal point of the campus when it was initially constructed.
Building(s): Entries and Exits–85.1. The public entry is located adjacent to
the administration area and visitor parking. Mean score–2.22. The second lowest of
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the mean statement scores on the survey, this aspect has been addressed through other
previously mentioned low score analyses. Public entry requires visitors to walk across
campus before entering the main building, as noted by all but one respondent in their
interviews. In summarizing this specific item, the superintendent succinctly stated, “The
public entry and visitor parking are located in the main parking lot, which is not near the
administration building.” The SRO observed that a visitor with scant knowledge of the
campus could reach and walk into several other buildings before entering the main office.
Building(s): Entries and Exits–87.3. Extensive windows and glazed doors
enhance natural surveillance of the public entry. Mean score–2.22. The
administrative assistant, before installation of the campus monitoring station, was often
the first adult to encounter campus visitors, which also means that a visitor had traversed
the entire campus and likely encountered students on their way to the main office. There
are windows into the lobby but no sightlines prior to the visitor physically entering the
building. Specifically, this respondent stated,
The design and architecture of the building are a safety issue. The office is located
in the last building on campus and visitor parking is in the very front of the
school. Few windows in the actual design of the building and its location do not
allow for surveillance of visitors.
There are two small windows in two of the administrative offices–the third has no
windows–through which the courtyard is moderately visible but not the building entry or
public entry. Though this statement had the second lowest score, the campus monitor
now notifies the administrative assistant, SRO, administrators, and custodians of each
visitor to campus (see Appendix D); therefore, although this item had a low score, it has
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somewhat been addressed with the addition of the campus monitor and timely, consistent
two-way radio communication from the front of campus.
Building(s): Entries and Exits–90.6. The design of emergency exits, such as
the use of alarms, deters access from the outside. Mean score–2.71. The
administrative assistant noted specifically in her interview that she felt secondary
building doors were not always secured. One of the assistant principals stated that the
verbal directive is for all secondary doors to be locked at all times, adding that the only
doors to remain unlocked during the school day are the doors that face the courtyard.
Interestingly, a cursory view of the EHS safety plan revealed that under normal
conditions, classroom doors remain locked throughout the day. It fails to make note of
exterior doors, regardless of whether they are facing the courtyard or secondary exits.
The other assistant principal bluntly stated, “Once an incident started, we could be locked
down in seconds, but the intruder can get in buildings.”
Interior: Main/Visitor Lobby–125.11. Motivational signs, temporary or
permanent, herald accomplishments, reflect students. Mean score–2.89; Interior:
Student Entry Areas Other Than Main Lobby–135.8. The entry areas are enhanced
with plants, artwork, posters, and/or other physical means. Mean score–2.56;
137.10. Motivational signs, temporary or permanent, herald accomplishments,
reflect student pride, give positive messages, and otherwise encourage student
excellence. Mean score–2.78; and 138.11. Student displays include a wide range of
student interests and cultural backgrounds. Mean score–2.56. The review committee
combined these four statements of agreement due to one overwhelming theme throughout
the interview process: a lack of student-centered displays throughout the entire campus.
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Notably, as observed by the assistant superintendent, there are displays in the main lobby
heralding athletics accomplishments; however, in the buildings at large (main lobby
included), there is little else promoting clubs/organizations, motivational posters, or
student displays of artwork or cultural awareness. The SRO remarked that other than the
arts building and career and technical education building, “there aren’t really any other
student interest displays.” The superintendent similarly stated, “During my visits to the
school I have seen very little artwork or posters to enhance the appearance.” Further, an
assistant principal noted that areas in which student displays could occur have been taken
over by COVID-19-related material. The other assistant principal added,
If anyone came on campus and walked through the buildings, they would see that
athletic achievements are well represented. We have entire walls covered with
accomplishments. Where do I find the arts? What about awards in HOSA, DECA,
Scholarships, Quiz bowl, Science Olympiad, outside interests–rodeo, race car
driving, etc. We have a lot of students to spotlight.
According to the administrative assistant, a lack of space due to building design is
one of the factors hindering the above statements. Interestingly, she added, “If by cultural
backgrounds, diversity is implied, it is not wide ranged or visible on campus.” It bears
noting here that EHS is 74% White, non-Hispanic, reflective of a presumed lack of
diversity based simply on being far less diverse than the state average of 52% for the
same time period. Though they were not all noted above, there are four additional
statements of agreement related to the Interiors category that reference hallways/corridors
which also scored less than 3, and they reveal the same trend as that just noted.
Interior: Restrooms–166.5. Restroom light controls are secured to prevent
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unauthorized access. Mean score–2.33. Restrooms are difficult to supervise for obvious
reasons, and a fundamental aspect of CPTED is adequate lighting so the inhabitants of a
given space can see. As such, the Safe Schools coordinator was “shocked” to discover
that restrooms at EHS had light controls that were accessible to students. Graffiti and
other illicit activities occur in restrooms due to supervisory difficulties, according to the
assistant principals, and appropriate lighting is necessary; but they each feel it should be
more controlled. As the light controls currently exist, any student could turn the lights off
in a restroom to conceal themselves or others and, likewise, engage in prohibited activity.
Interior: Locker Rooms (Men/Boys)–215.4. Lockers and/or locker doors are
see-through. Mean score–1.75; Interior: Locker Rooms (Women/Girls)–226.4.
Lockers and/or locker doors are see-through. Mean score–1.86. Both of these items
were combined due to very low scores. They were also combined because, when
interviewed, the respondents were admittedly not entirely sure what the statements were
referencing. The traditional lockers have been removed altogether and, if replaced, were
replaced with cubby-style units with open fronts. Of the respondents, a majority of them
remarked that they likely should have responded Unable to Observe.
Interior: Locker Rooms (Men/Boys)–216.5. Shower areas are easily
monitored. Mean score–2.86; Interior: Locker Rooms (Women/Girls)–227.5.
Shower areas are easily monitored. Mean score–2.71. As with the prior statements
regarding locker rooms, these items had low scores, but many of the respondents
admitted they likely should have answered differently. Further, following COVID-19
protocol based on the governor’s orders, the showers were not utilized by any students or
adults.
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Interior: General–247.6. Staff and teachers have highly visible name tags.
Mean score–2.89. The EHS safety plan at all levels of security states, “Name tags will be
worn by faculty at all times.” According to both assistant principals, a vast majority of
the staff at EHS do not wear name tags, even though they have been provided.
WHS
Grounds: Perimeter–7.4. The perimeter is secured in areas not easily
monitored. Mean score–2.38. Much like its cross-county counterpart, WHS is in a rural
area surrounded by farmland, woods, and sparse housing. The principal noted that there
are houses in front of the school, mobile homes for itinerant farm workers beside the
campus on a private side road, and “all areas are accessible to anyone [who] wants into
our school.” The administrative assistant added that unless someone simply drives in the
main gate during the day, they can otherwise enter campus from any other direction and
not be seen.
Grounds: Points of Entry–14.5. Secondary pedestrian entries are secured
during school hours. Mean score–2. The district’s safety program, since installation of
the campus monitors, is that all secondary campus entrances are secured during the
school day. That this statement of agreement scored so low was surprising to the
maintenance supervisor and Safe Schools coordinator. They both believed semantics
played a role in the score but noted that pedestrians can enter campus from any point.
Securing vehicular entrances does not stop foot traffic from entering campus at other
locations. The Safe Schools coordinator added that the layout of the buildings did not
help in this area either because it obscured sightlines to the perimeter of the campus,
hampering detection of pedestrians entering campus.
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Grounds: Parking Areas–45.9. Visitor parking is located directly adjacent to
the main entry of the administrative offices. Mean score–2.75. Unlike EHS, WHS has
two designated areas for visitor parking–a small section allocated for visitors within the
student parking lot and spaces in the rear near the main administrative building. The
assistant principal and Safe Schools coordinator noted that it may not be the best idea to
have visitors and students in the same demarcated parking lot; but otherwise, there was
parking beside the administrative office. Like EHS, the visitor parking in the student lot
requires visitors to walk through the campus to enter the main office. Recent safety
protocol requires visitors to stop at the campus monitor and identify themselves, and the
monitor then notifies the office of the individual’s name and purpose for being on campus
(see Appendix D). This recent change in security procedures has made the actual location
of visitor parking less of an issue.
Grounds: Exterior Athletic Areas–63.4. There are well-defined and easily
monitored areas for storing backpacks, jackets, and other personal items. Mean
score–2.38. The school-level administrators all agreed that most of the sports teams and
their respective facilities have areas for the athletes to store their possessions. In the past
year, metal structures have been installed at three different playing fields to help with
this. What was not clear in the statement, according to the school-based respondents, is
whether it was referring to the athletes or students in general. The Safe Schools
coordinator added that for indoor athletics facilities, there were locker rooms available
for storing items, but they were not well-monitored.
Grounds: Other–65.2. There are no hiding places in or around dumpster
areas. Mean score–2.88. Like EHS, the dumpsters at WHS are located at the edge of the
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woods, securing the view behind them. Unlike EHS, whose dumpsters are within 50 feet
of a school building, the dumpsters at WHS are located on the back edge of campus, well
over 300 feet from the nearest building. The review committee noted that the statement
was not referencing the quality of the hiding place. As such, the director of secondary
schools stated, “Anybody can get to the dumpsters at any point. They are not locked, and
people can access them relatively easily.”
Buildings: Entries and Exits–85.1. The public entry is located adjacent to the
administration area and visitor parking. Mean score–2. The superintendent noted that
answering this question relied on what one’s perception of “public entry” may be–is it
walking into the building perimeter or physically entering a building? Though it may not
be near parking, public entry is located close to the main office. The doorway itself is not
in view, but he added ample windows are overlooking the area from the administrative
office. Based on other respondent interviews, this same ambiguity of the term “public
entry” was noted and likely affected the score. The director of secondary schools further
noted that, as with EHS, these schools were built at a time when sightlines and security
were not priorities; otherwise, “the main offices would not have been located at the rear
of the campuses.”
Building(s): Entries and Exits–87.3. Extensive windows and glazed doors
enhance natural surveillance of the public entry. Mean score–2. To address this
statement, the principal remarked simply that there are “too many blind spots.” At the
time he completed the survey and participated in the interview, WHS was in the process
of having a new camera system installed with high-definition cameras, cloud storage,
and, more importantly, a greater number of cameras. He added that new cameras will be
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essential for “revealing” some of those hidden areas and that will be a key determinant
for placement of the additional new cameras.
Regarding the issue of defining “public entry,” the maintenance supervisor
observed that there are windows in the location(s) he would consider the public entry.
Though not facing the perimeter of campus, pedestrian walkways for visitors are
paralleled by buildings that have windows facing the walkways. They are classroom
windows but windows nonetheless. In either scenario, there are windows open to the
area; what is not visible is the entry door itself.
Building(s): General–107.1. Buildings are organized to promote natural
surveillance of the school campus. Mean score–2.63. Like EHS, WHS is a multibuilding layout surrounding a courtyard (see Appendix D). The superintendent noted
again that multiple windows are overlooking the courtyard, but “they are not organized to
overlook outer areas such as parking lots, fields, and outer sidewalks.” The assistant
superintendent stated that “natural surveillance” (human supervision) simply is not
possible due to the building layout, adding that the courtyard is visible but little else. The
principal remarked simply, “Again, the layout of the buildings is an issue.”
Approaching this issue from another angle, the maintenance supervisor discussed
how current design for high school campuses typically revolves around a single, often
multi-story, building. This trend has developed for the very reason at issue here, being
able to surveil a campus more adequately. He added, “It would be hard to situate multiple
school buildings and still be able to have a good view of necessary areas.”
Interiors: Main / Visitor Lobby–121.7. Signs provide directions to major
school areas, i.e., administrative offices, cafeteria, media room, auditorium,
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gymnasium, etc. Mean score–2.75. WHS has a marquee in front of the campus that
details announcements to passers-by. Once on campus, a sign instructs visitors to stop at
the campus monitor, at which point they are directed where to go (see Appendix D).
There is little else regarding directional signage on the WHS campus, as observed by the
SRO.
Interiors: Corridors–150.3. There are no hiding places. Mean score–2.5.
Several of the respondents remarked about the layout of the hallways, asserting that the
design of the buildings creates hiding places, per se. As with EHS, the hallways circle the
buildings; restrooms and electrical/storage rooms are on the interior of the circle, and
classrooms are outside the circle. The SRO mirrored the EHS SRO when he stated that
there were poor sightlines inside the buildings due to this layout. The review committee
also noted how the design limited vision to other hallways inside the buildings as well as
to the entry doors.
Interiors: Corridors–156.9. There are authorized adults visible in the interior
corridors during class changes. Mean score–2.75. The assistant principal noted that as
a result of COVID-19 protocol, staff are typically in their rooms during class changes
wiping down desks and other high contact surfaces, adding that in a normal school year
they are more visible. This same observation was noted by the school-based respondents.
At the time of survey administration, the district was operating under the governor’s Plan
B (50% student capacity) so there were fewer students to observe; however, the cleaning
and disinfecting protocols required by this plan also made it tremendously difficult for
there to be any adult supervision during class changes.
Interiors: Restrooms–166.5. Restroom light controls are secured to prevent
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unauthorized access. Mean score–2.5. Like at EHS, the Safe Schools coordinator was
somewhat surprised to realize the light controls were unsecured. The lights are multigang switches, much like you would find in a house, with stainless steel covers.
Otherwise, they are freely accessible to any occupant(s) of the restroom.
Interiors: In-school suspension areas–185.2. In-school suspension areas are
enhanced with plants, artwork, or other physical means. Mean score–2.5. Somewhat
humorously, the response to this statement was generally along the lines of, “It’s ISS,
why would we enhance it?” The ISS room is an old classroom that has since been divided
into office space and an ISS area. There are some tables with desktop computers, but it is
otherwise sparsely adorned.
Interiors: Cafeterias and food courts–198.12. Student displays and other
artwork include a wide range of student interest and cultural backgrounds. Mean
score–2.38. For the current 2020-2021 school year, students are not staying in the
cafeteria due to COVID-19 protocol; they pick up their food and return to classrooms or
sit outside. COVID-19 protocol aside, the mean score for this statement is notable only in
that it does not reflect the corridors, classrooms, or lobby/office areas of the rest of the
school. WHS scored well in statements regarding student displays as they pertain to other
areas of the school. Whether created by the students or put in place for the students, the
school is amply adorned with student-focused displays. The principal proudly reiterated
this ideal: “Our signs promote teachers…they help educate students…and they also
promote our student of the week.”
Interiors: Locker Rooms (Men/Boys) –212.1. Locker areas are easily
monitored. Mean score–2.86; Interiors: Locker Rooms (Women/Girls) –223.1.
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Locker areas are easily monitored. Mean score–2.88; 226.4. Lockers and/or locker
doors are see-through. Mean score–2.25; 227.5. Shower areas are easily monitored.
Mean score–2.88; 229.7. Light controls are secured to prevent unauthorized access.
Mean score–2.75; 233.11. All areas of the locker room are in good condition. These
items are all grouped together for two reasons: (a) the adult respondents all noted that
locker rooms are, by their very nature, difficult to monitor; and (b) the women/girls
locker room is currently undergoing a much-needed renovation that will address some of
the aforementioned statements.
It bears noting here that at the time of the survey and interviews, shower areas in
both locker rooms were not being utilized due to COVID-19 protocol. The district is
operating under the governor’s Plan B for opening schools and, as such, it is
recommended that there be no more than seven persons per 1,000 square feet of floor
space (NCDHHS, 2020), which further limits locker room availability. This aspect aside,
the assistant principal remarked that from a supervision standpoint, there are no cameras,
and they would not recommend an adult be physically in the locker room(s) when
students are changing or showering.
Interiors: General–246.5. Visitors have distinctive and highly visible name
tags. Mean score–2.75. COVID-19 protocol and interim district policy do not allow
visitors to campus. Parents may check students in or out of school, but no visitors are not
allowed to linger on campus. Speakers, recruiters, and trade or educational sponsors are
prohibited altogether under the current operational plan; therefore, name tags are not
observable or necessary at the time of this survey. Per the respondents, the scores given
were based on their experience before COVID-19.
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Interiors: General–247.6. Staff and teachers have highly visible name tags.
Mean score–1.88. At the time the survey was administered, current year name tags had
not yet been allocated.
Additional Observations and Interviews
The interviews conducted for this research ultimately were made more difficult by
the COVID-19 pandemic and state-mandated protocols. On top of social distancing
requirements, scheduling interviews was interrupted several times by school closures
resulting from COVID-19 clusters appearing at the schools as well as quarantines
resulting from exposure to a COVID-19-positive individual, exposure in the home from a
spouse or child, or the interviewee themselves testing positive. Based on the individual
circumstances, therefore, interviews with the adult respondents were conducted inperson, through Zoom meetings, or as written documents with follow-up phone calls.
Other than to remark on weather conditions or frequency of visits, the Additional
Observations section of the surveys was not utilized by many of the respondents. To elicit
deeper responses, the respondents were asked again for additional observations during the
interviews. Including questions related directly to an individual’s specific answer or
ratings given on the survey, each respondent was also asked (a) if there was anything in
the survey they felt was particularly relevant to EHS or WHS and (b) whether addressed
through the survey or not, are there any areas they would like to see the district
specifically focus on concerning safety and security at the high school(s). The most
relevant statements are included below.
SRO: “Updated security cameras and more cameras throughout the buildings and
campus. We currently have two buildings with cameras in them, out of nine.”
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Assistant principal:
We need to stress the importance of SRO’s, mental health of our students and
staff, and continue to build community bonds securing the alliance of school and
home–open-door policy without fear of punishment or ridicule–if someone needs
help, they should have a certainty that they can safely seek assistance from us.
Assistant principal: “I believe that there needs to be more focus on the security in
our upper parking lot for students [see Appendix C]. Also, the open school grounds
provide a myriad of possibilities for mischief.”
Principal: “We need a new locking system with ID badge entry.”
Safe Schools coordinator:
I would like to see the main campus perimeter have some visually appealing
fencing added between adjacent buildings to help security of the main campus
area. I have seen other school systems doing this and it would help our high
school campuses’ security greatly. Also, I would like to see interior doors in the
courtyard have access control doors to allow the building to remain more secure
throughout the school day.
Maintenance supervisor:
I think the most pressing issue is securing the perimeter around both high schools
to keep unwanted visitors out. I also think both high schools need to have all
doors locked at all times–the only efficient way that I see doing this is by adding
access control to all buildings. This would allow student and staff access but
eliminate the ability for just anyone to walk into a building.
Director of secondary schools:
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I believe our schools do about as well as they can with keeping our campuses safe
and secure. It is essentially impossible to ever fully secure EHS or WHS…but I
believe the staff members at the schools do the best they can to keep their
campuses safe.
Assistant superintendent: “I would like to see an increase in the number of
cameras and means of surveillance to keep all students and staff safe from outside
threats.”
Superintendent:
The high school campuses are difficult to secure due to the open nature of the
school campuses and the situation of buildings being built around a central
courtyard. I do believe that the district will need to investigate more efficient
ways to secure buildings and the courtyard areas.
Student CPTED Audit Results
Former students were solicited to take the CPTED Audit. The Audit had 16 openended questions and 44 separate items that the former students rated as satisfactory/
unsatisfactory. There were 27 respondents for EHS and 43 for WHS.
Open-Ended Questions
How safe was your high school? This is asking for your gut reaction to your
school and campus. EHS–26/27 indicated they felt safe. WHS–36/43 indicated they felt
safe. Comments: EHS–“I felt safe because it’s Eastern High School, but there could be
extra measures and maybe a slightly more extensive security team.” WHS–“I think it’s
pretty safe, there is always some kind of officer at the school and someone at the gate.”
Regarding campus safety and security, what are some things that you think
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your school did well? EHS–9/27 referred to knowing who is coming on/off campus,
5/27 referred to keeping an eye on students, 3/27 mentioned SRO. WHS–15/43 referred
to knowing who is coming on/off campus, 6/43 referred to SRO, 4/43 mentioned
cleanliness of campus/custodians. Comments: WHS–“Our janitors at WHS were
phenomenal with what they did for the school, I always saw them doing something and
never relaxing.”
Regarding campus safety and security, what are some areas that you think
your school could do better? EHS–9/27 remarked “don’t know” or “nothing”; 2/27
mentioned teachers carrying firearms; 2/27 referred to always knowing where students
are. WHS–7/43 referred to “more cameras” or “more security”; 16/43 remarked “don’t
know,” “nothing,” or “everything was good.”
Are there any items relating to campus safety and security that you felt were
lacking or missing altogether? EHS–24/27 remarked “nothing” or “no.” WHS–4/43
referred to more SROs or armed guards; 35/43 remarked “don’t know,” “nothing,” or
“everything was good.”
Were there any areas on campus that you believe are good hiding places?
EHS–6/27 remarked “no,” 4/27 noted locker rooms, 2/27 noted baseball field, and 5/27
noted woods. WHS–19/43 remarked “no” or “not aware of any”; 5/43 noted field
house/workout room.
Is there adequate lighting during the normal hours of operation? EHS–26/27
replied favorably. WHS–29/43 replied favorably; 10/43 replied “no” or “don’t know.”
Do the adults on campus provide adequate supervision during the school
day? EHS–26/27 replied favorably. WHS–40/43 replied favorably. Comments: WHS– “I
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would like to believe that they try their best to maintain a good amount of supervision
throughout the day, but they can’t keep an eye out for every single student.”
Do the adults on campus adequately supervise common areas in which
students gather during breaks or between classes? EHS–26/27 replied favorably.
WHS–38/43 replied favorably. Comments: Where comments were added, one WHS
graduate referred to seeing the SRO out walking around students. Otherwise, the
comments referred to teachers being visible in the courtyard or hallways.
Were pedestrian routes through campus easy to identify? EHS–27/27 replied
favorably. WHS–42/43 replied favorably. Comments: The one WHS student who did not
reply favorably remarked that there should be directional arrows or lines on sidewalks.
As a side note, currently, there are directional arrows and lines due to COVID-19
protocol; however, having already graduated, this former student would not be aware of
this.
Did having an SRO on campus make you feel safer? EHS–26/27 replied
favorably. WHS–33/43 replied favorably; 9/43 replied “no” or “not really”; 1/43 stated
that they do not remember ever seeing an SRO.
Did the guard hut make you feel safer? EHS–24/27 replied favorably. WHS–
25/43 replied favorably; 16/43 replied “no” or “not really”; 2/43 indicated they did not
know there was one.
Did the individual working in the guard hut make you feel safer? EHS–23/27
replied favorably, one of those remarking, “Yeah, loved him.” WHS–22/43 replied
negatively, many of those noting that they were aware it was “just/only” one of the bus
drivers.
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Do trees or bushes interfere with being able to see certain areas of campus?
EHS–26/27 replied, “no/not really.” WHS–39/43 replied they do not impede sight; one
stated they “added charisma” to the campus; and one remarked they may be good hiding
places for intruders, but they could also be good hiding places for students if there was an
intruder.
Do trees or bushes provide places where individuals could hide or not be
easily detected? EHS–22/27 replied, “no/not really.” Two students noted the woods
surrounding campus could be good places to hide. WHS–33/43 replied “no/not really”;
9/43 replied, “yes/somewhat.” Comments: WHS–“They serve a dual purpose, hiding
place of a bad person or somewhere to hide from the bad person.”
While at school, did you know who to notify if you needed assistance? Every
respondent from both schools answered favorably to this question.
Are buildings, offices, or classrooms easily identified with appropriate
signage? EHS–27/27 replied favorably. WHS–40/43 replied favorably.
Unsatisfactory Responses
As previously noted, there were 44 items on the Audit that former students had to
rate as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. Of 1,148 individual responses for EHS, only 116
(10.1%) were unsatisfactory. For WHS, 246 of 1,892 (13%) were unsatisfactory. Table 5
is not a complete listing of responses from the unsatisfactory/satisfactory statements;
however, it does display those statements for which greater than 20% of the respondents
deemed a statement unsatisfactory.
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Table 5
Student Audit Unsatisfactory Responses
EHS
WHS
27 students
43 students
Hiding Spots
7 = 26%
15 = 35%
Courtyard
6 = 22%
< 20%
Student Restrooms
6 = 22%
< 20%
Evidence of graffiti on campus
11 = 41%
16 = 37%
Sign in front of school
6 = 22%
< 20%
Main office easy to identify for visitors
8 = 30%
9 = 21%
Emergency communication devices / hardware
6 = 22%
< 20%
Security cameras
< 20%
10 = 23%
Total U responses/total responses
116/1,148 (10%) 246/1,892 (13%)

The review committee chose the 20% threshold (11% of the statements) for
reviewing unfavorable ratings based on it being a similar threshold for scores (12% of
statement mean scores) below 3 on the CSA. As shown in Table 5, even at 20%, there
were not that many statements rated unfavorably by a significant number of the former
students.
After comparing the categories in Table 5 to the CSA and interviews, the review
committee determined that the categories are relatively common between the two survey
groups. The adults and former-student groups demonstrated that there are hiding spots on
campus in the woods surrounding campus and in buildings. Additionally, the CSA
revealed that there are hiding spots around the dumpsters.
The aforementioned groups’ responses also demonstrate that the main office is
difficult to identify. What cannot be ascertained from the former-student responses is the
reason the office may be difficult to identify. An analysis of the adult responses indicates
that office location–rear of the campus–is the primary issue; a lack of signage is a
secondary concern.
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The notable exception to inter-group agreement is “Evidence of Graffiti on
Campus.” Former students from both schools identified graffiti/vandalism as their most
significant concern, 41% and 37% respectively. The adults had opportunities to address
campus graffiti/vandalism when they completed the CSA, but through the interviews, the
adults who were queried on this topic noted that graffiti may exist in places or locations
that are difficult to monitor. Of the adult respondents, one assistant principal at EHS
noted the existence of graffiti/vandalism in restrooms and on columns that circle the
courtyard. Otherwise, the rest of the adults did not comment on it or were unaware of its
existence. The review committee also noted that adults and students have separate
restrooms and determined that an adult could be unaware of graffiti or vandalism in a
student restroom unless they were told explicitly of its existence.
There are five additional statements shown in Table 5 that are not shared by the
schools but reached the 20% threshold with one of the schools. For EHS, those
statements were courtyard, student restrooms, sign in front of school, and emergency
communication devices/hardware. Interestingly, two of those categories were specifically
mentioned by the CSA and Audit respondents from WHS as being positive aspects of
their campus: courtyard and student restrooms.
As noted by the superintendent, the courtyard at WHS has mature landscaping, a
memorial to veterans, and a statue of the school mascot. By comparison, the EHS
courtyard is relatively stark, but he noted, “a lot has been done the past 4 years” in terms
of its outward appearance. A few of the WHS former-student respondents commented
positively on the trees and shrubs in their courtyard, while one of the EHS students
remarked that the courtyard may have been nice “before the school cut everything down.”
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Student restrooms are mentioned by former WHS students, specifically how clean
they are. The same student who commented on how hard the custodians work also noted
that clean restrooms show others how much they care for their school. EHS students,
conversely, rated their restrooms as unsatisfactory (22% of the respondents). The review
committee believes there is a relationship between restrooms and graffiti/vandalism;
however, absent data proving otherwise, that will remain an assumption only.
EHS former-student responses revealed that the sign in front of the school is
unsatisfactory (22%). The signs at the two high schools are almost identical, older signs
with removable lettering. The sign at WHS is located at the road along a fence,
unobscured by landscaping or trees. The sign at EHS is also located on the road along a
fence; however, as noted by the SRO, it is obscured by trees and is difficult to see if
someone is looking for relevant announcements or information. The review committee
believes the EHS score to be a function of the landscaping; not the sign specifically, but
again, this is an interpretation based on a review of the data, not stated explicitly.
The one measure that 23% of former students from WHS alone did not perceive
favorably, security cameras, is presently being addressed by the district. At the time the
surveys were administered, new cameras (and more cameras) were in the planning stages.
To be installed at WHS initially, once the installation is complete at WHS, the same
system will be forthcoming at EHS. For planning purposes, both schools should have
new camera systems in place by June 30, 2021, the end of the fiscal year.
Summary
There were nine CSAs completed per school, with Table 3 outlining the adults
who participated in the CSA process. A total of 70 CPTED Audit surveys were
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completed by former students as a means of common-theme analysis between the two
sets of surveys. The bulk of Chapter 4 was spent outlining those areas in need of
improvement at EHS and WHS. Though a significant amount of the chapter was devoted
to discussing those statements, to a lesser degree there was also an analysis of those areas
in which the schools are deemed to be performing well.
Although there were several statements of agreement that scored below 3, as
outlined above, no category or subcategory had a composite score of less than 3. Of the
individual categories listed in Table 4, the overall lowest mean score was 3.09, shared by
both schools for Buildings: Entries and Exits. Likewise, EHS did not have a single
subcategory score 4 or higher; WHS had three subcategories score 4 or higher: Grounds:
Bus Unloading and Loading (4.02), Building(s): Courtyards (4.09), and Interiors:
Cafeteria(s) and Food Courts (4).
Overall, the total mean scores for the schools were 3.56 for EHS and 3.57 for
WHS. Of the 266 individual statements of agreement on the CSA, EHS had a mean score
of 4 or higher on 67 statements, while WHS had a mean score of 4 or higher on 74 of the
statements. Based on CDC guidelines for scoring the CSA, both schools’ total and
categorical mean scores are “acceptable but may need scrutiny.”
Based on an analysis of the data contained in the survey responses, areas in which
students are dense are those that score the highest. The review committee asserts that this
is due to there being an increased level of supervision in many of those areas. In areas
that are difficult to see (perimeter of campus), the scores typically trend downward. In the
more obscure areas (restrooms, locker rooms), the results demonstrate the lowest scores,
again based on how well adults can monitor those areas. The committee also determined
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a relationship in scoring between factors that obscure sightlines (buildings, woods) and
those that enhance supervision (open common areas, signage, windows, and cameras).
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Introduction
In assessing school conditions, it is also important to know the reasons why a
particular school may have been designed in a certain manner. Different eras in school
design carried with them a variety of priorities, which rarely included school safety as
one of the primary concerns. Schools were designed primarily for function, communities,
and community-wide use and as post-war technological and mechanical innovations.
Cited by the National Center for Education Statistics, in an October 1949 article
from Architectural Forum, the editor noted that the greatest output of the war was
“children, not tanks” (Baker, 2012, p. 10). By 1949, more than 7 million children had
been born in the United States, taxing school districts across the nation. Post-World War
II school design saw an emergence of the industrial school (Baker, 2012; Reid, 1951).
These buildings were cavernous, multi-story buildings built around the booming
economy that proliferated after the war. Vocational spaces were abundant so the schools
could contribute to the industry’s need for workers, and architects were cognizant of
designing areas for community use. Libraries, gymnasiums, and auditoriums were
typically centrally located with offices and classrooms surrounding them, often on
multiple levels (Reid, 1951). In addition, many of these schools were constructed in
population centers where available land may have been sparse. The availability of land,
or lack thereof, contributed to the development of the industrial multi-story school
because building “up” required less space (Barrett et al., 2019). Reid (1951) further noted
that it was recommended practice to design the centerpiece spaces with exterior access so
the community could take advantage of their availability.
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Figure 3
Example of Industrial School Design

Note. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salisbury_High_School_(North_Carolina)
From 1958 to 1968, an additional 2.3 million students were added to the student
population in the decade and a half following the conclusion of the war (Baker, 2012). As
population centers became more crowded, suburbs began to develop as people spread out.
Following the shift in family mobility, school construction accelerated to meet this
burgeoning need. Large interior spaces had been acceptable design principles, but they
were ill-suited for addressing the population boom. Non-load-bearing dividing walls also
began to appear in many of the urban/industrial schools as an “efficiency” measure used
to turn large spaces into multiple rooms (Baker, 2012).
Reflective of urban sprawl, schools also began to follow the spreading out of the
population by utilizing more land in their design. The subsequent need for more schools
in the 1950s saw the development of one-story, flat-roofed structures. These designs
featured more “components” that also lessened the cost of traditional school construction
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(Baker, 2012). Due to post-war hostilities and to help justify the shift to one-story
schools, the National Council on Schoolhouse Construction (1964) added that these
buildings were also much easier to evacuate than their urban multi-story counterparts
(Baker, 2012).
The finger plan school, which focused on maximizing sunlight in classrooms,
developed during the 1950s from the need for maximizing construction expenditures. As
fingers emanate from the hand, wings were built off central spaces. These wings were
typically a single hallway with classrooms on one or both sides. Hallways began turning
into covered walkways to also allow for exposure to fresh air (Baker, 2012). Designed to
maximize sunlight entering the classroom, new architectural features began to emerge;
sawtooth roof designs, floor-to-ceiling windows, and skylights became common design
elements of these spaces (Baker, 2012).
Figure 4
Example of Finger Plan Design

Note. Baker (2012).
As new technologies began to emerge in the 1960s–primarily air management
systems and fluorescent lighting–school design began a subsequent shift from fresh air
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and sunlight. Floor-to-ceiling windows were phased out of school design in favor of solid
walls with mechanical lighting. Further, with developments in heating, cooling, and
ventilation systems, the need for operable, energy-inefficient windows was likewise
reduced (Baker, 2012).
The open-school plan emerged from these technological and mechanical
developments. School buildings became separate “pods” with little differentiation of the
individual spaces within each building; a classroom in one building would likely appear
and function similarly to a classroom in another building. Innovations in mechanical
systems meant that multiple systems could be installed, eliminating the necessity of a
single building being controlled by a very large, cumbersome system (Baker, 2012). The
separate buildings were often constructed around a common area, which could consist of
offices, a gymnasium or auditorium, or even an open courtyard. It is this open concept
design that is most evidenced by EHS and WHS–multiple buildings surrounding a central
space (courtyard) and minimal windows (see Appendices C and D).
Another factor influencing school design during the 1960s and 1970s was not
related to technological or educational needs. Instead, escalating tensions between the
United States and the Soviet Union led many districts to renovate or construct buildings
that could be used as bomb or fallout shelters in the event nuclear arms were utilized
(Ogata, 2008). For these reasons, separate buildings became the norm in school
construction; if one building was damaged or destroyed, there would be other buildings
available for shelter. To this day, school buildings in many districts are utilized as public
gathering places or emergency operation centers in times of crises.
Recent trends in school construction are somewhat reflective of the era
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immediately following the end of World War II. As buildings are being replaced or new
schools are built, schools are seeing a shift back towards the single-building school
design. Among the reasons given for this shift, finances and school safety are cited as the
top two reasons for this shift. For obvious reasons, a single building can be controlled
(access control) and observed (technology, cameras) more easily than multiple buildings;
this is particularly pertinent in the decades since Columbine in which heinous acts of
school violence have become more frequent occurrences (Musu-Gillette et al., 2018;
REMS, 2018). Architects have been charged with designing schools that have highly
controlled access points but are still welcoming and nurturing (Blad, 2018). Without it
being overly stated, a single-building school (multi-story or modified “finger” plan) is the
simplest way to actively monitor and control access to school buildings. As school design
continues to trend towards a focus on safety, it is possible to foresee a time when the
open concept campus may be a proverbial relic.
Effects of Violence on School Design
School safety has always been important, but the intense emotional effect and
subsequent aftermath of school shootings tend to push these violent acts to the fore.
Recent government data have demonstrated that violent incidents in schools have been on
the decline since Columbine (NIJ, 2017), but the nature of the events maintains the
public’s focus on these types of tragedies. The Columbine High School tragedy in 1999
led to the Safe Schools Initiative, a report on violent school incidents, co-authored by the
U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret Service (Ames, 2019). This report
compiled statistics from violent school incidents from 1974 through 2000. In the
incidents studied, 75% of school attackers had told a friend or classmate about their
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plans, and 95% had developed a plan prior to the attack (Ames, 2019; NIJ 2002).
The NIJ followed up with the Comprehensive School Safety Initiative in 2016.
This research analyzed school safety measures since Columbine, specifically focusing on
technology and school needs. The major conclusion was that there is no single panacea
for school safety. Instead, a combination of factors that are appropriate for each unique
situation must be tailored to meet a school’s needs (NIJ, 2017). According to Vossekuil et
al. (2000), “Schools may make the best use of their resources by focusing on prevention”
(p. 6) instead of relying on a forceful response from law enforcement or other
governmental agencies.
CDC Recommendations for Safe Schools
The CDC designed the survey instrument used in this case study. As supporters of
CPTED, the CDC recommends five key areas in which schools should focus to prevent
violence from occurring:


Natural surveillance–creating ways to supervise areas inhabited by students as
well as those who may be entering campus.



Access management–using signs and landscaping to limit or encourage access
to and use of certain areas.



Territoriality–creating a welcoming environment through the use of positive
school signs, student work, and other vestiges of school culture.



Physical maintenance–repair, maintenance, and upkeep of space; this
demonstrates that the school cares and the area is being monitored.



Order maintenance–adults are visible and observant without being
threatening.
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The purpose of the survey instrument is to determine those areas in which the school or
district is performing well as well as to determine those areas in need of improvement. As
demonstrated in the CSA (see Appendix B), all the statements being measured focus on
at least one of the above-listed characteristics to determine how safe or secure a given
location may be. Reflective of the NIJ’s conclusion, each school is a unique entity, and a
combination of the aforementioned factors must be considered in addressing any school’s
unique needs.
Vossekuil et al.’s (2000) report asserted that schools should focus on prevention;
the CDC’s guidelines align and support the same ideal. Schools are not fortresses but are
institutions of learning in which students and adults should feel safe. Utilized properly, a
school that incorporates CPTED principles into its planning should display one or more
of the following characteristics:


Creating a warm and welcoming environment



Fostering a sense of physical and social order



Creating a sense of ownership by students



Sending positive messages to students



Maximizing the presence of authority figures



Minimizing opportunities for out-of-sight activities



Managing access to all school areas

Research Questions
The case study conducted for this research used the CSA to determine the degree
to which certain conditions existed, or did not exist, on two rural high school campuses.
The survey was administered to district-level personnel, school-based administrators,
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administrative assistants, and SROs and used a Likert scale to measure levels of
agreement with statements. A second survey, the Audit, was administered to a random
group of former students from each high school. This survey had short answer questions
and individual statements or characteristics that the former students marked as
satisfactory/unsatisfactory.
Research Question 1 was, “Based on the principles of CPTED, how safe are the
two high school campuses?” Based on the total mean score for each school (3.56 for EHS
and 3.57 for WHS) and using the score interpretation recommendations from the CDC,
each of the high schools for which surveys were completed is considered to be safe.
According to the CDC scoring guidelines, a rating of 3 is acceptable but may bear
scrutiny. Ratings of 4-5 are compliant and warrant no further attention. Based again on
these guidelines, we can conclude that the schools’ safety and security practices are
acceptable but may require continued scrutiny of minor significance. To reiterate the
view of the director of secondary schools, he believes the schools are as “reasonably
safe” as they can be, given the nature and layout of each campus. The design itself is
prohibitive for being entirely secure, but measures have been put in place to extend the
“eyes” of each campus. These measures include the addition of the manned campus
monitoring stations at the main entrance to each campus–the initial step in the program
following the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Florida–and
upgrading the camera systems for each school, an integral piece of the district’s safety
and security planning.
The former student surveys are reflective of the information derived from the
CSA. Of 1,148 total satisfactory/unsatisfactory responses for EHS, only 10% of those
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were rated as unsatisfactory. For WHS, there were 1,892 responses, of which 13% were
unsatisfactory. No scoring guidelines were provided for the student audit, but with
positive response rates of 90% and 87% respectively, the review committee concluded
that the students view their former schools as safe places. Of the students surveyed, each
one of them knew where adults were on campus and how to get assistance, if needed. A
significant number of them remarked about the visibility of the SRO and noted that they
felt safe on the campuses (26/27 at EHS; 36/43 at WHS). Further, when asked what the
schools did well, 22/27 at EHS and 32/43 at WHS remarked that the schools knew who
was coming and going from campus; a majority of those students specifically mentioning
the addition of the campus monitor.
Though not a comprehensive list, based on the interviews and survey responses
from both test groups, areas or characteristics that were rated favorably include


Addition of the campus monitor



SROs are active



Schools were well-maintained



Buildings and athletics facilities are easy to identify



Where high numbers of students may be concentrated, their movement was
orderly and adults were available in a supervisory capacity



Interior lighting was satisfactory



Door and window hardware was in good working order

Research Question 2 was, “Based on CPTED principles, in what areas
(mechanical or natural) is SCS adequately implementing an effective safety and security
program?” Each adult respondent is aware that the perimeter of the campuses is open and
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difficult to monitor. To address the openness, and reflected in the results of the student
audit, the addition of the campus monitor was a beneficial step towards knowing who is
coming and going from campus. This individual communicates via two-way radio the
presence of any individual (student or adult) who enters campus. The communication is
received by the SROs, administrative assistants, custodians, and administrators. Recent
district safety planning has also directed the high schools to close secondary entrances
during student hours; taking this step funneled all traffic by the monitoring stations. The
addition of the monitor and closing secondary entrances was done as part of the district’s
safety and security program.
The adult respondents also felt that the school provided good supervision in areas
in which students frequently gather. The courtyards, bus loading and unloading, parent
pickup and drop-off, and cafeterias all scored well for the adult respondents. These areas
typically have adults assigned for supervisory duties when students are present and, as
such, are areas in which the former students also felt safe. They knew the adults were
present and that they could provide assistance if it was needed. One member of the
review committee noted that it looked like the adults followed the students in terms of
supervision–where there were significant numbers of students, one could expect also to
find seemingly adequate levels of supervision. Areas that were scored favorably by the
adults were


AM and PM student drop-off and pickup areas



Bus loading and unloading areas



Gymnasium/Auditorium



Cafeterias
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Research Question 3 was, “Based on CPTED principles, in what areas
(mechanical or natural) does SCS need to improve its safety and security program?”
Though both of the high schools had what are determined to be adequate scores for safety
and security implementation, there was broad agreement on those areas in need of
improvement. Many of those areas are difficult to observe or supervise in a perfect
scenario, so further discussion certainly would be warranted on how to address the
shortcomings.
The lowest scored category by former students and, strikingly, one of the highest
rated among the adults was regarding the presence of graffiti or vandalism on campus.
The students overwhelmingly scored this as their lowest measure. Adults, on the other
hand, rated the presence of graffiti or vandalism as acceptable. The review committee
believes this to be due to the location of the graffiti or vandalism, typically areas that get
little or no adult supervision. Restrooms and locker rooms are where the adults typically
do not provide a great deal of supervision, for seemingly obvious reasons, and this is
where the review committee presumes the disconnect exists–areas in which adults are
normally present are areas that are not defaced or otherwise vandalized.
Athletics fields also were not rated highly by either surveyed group. They are
detached from the buildings to begin with and, likewise, are scattered around the
perimeter of each campus. With each high school having scant windows facing the
perimeter of the campus, it is reasonable to foresee that supervision of those areas during
school hours is difficult. Further, they also abut wooded areas on both campuses.
Noted as a particular area of concern by the adults, as well as a good hiding area
by the former students, the woods are of particular concern. One administrative assistant
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noted specifically the woods at the rear of the campus being her biggest area of concern
because she felt they were the least observed/supervised area of the campus. Though they
provide cover for a would-be intruder, a few of the student respondents noted ironically
that the woods could also provide cover for students if an intruder were to enter campus
and they needed an area in which to escape. Dumpster areas also scored low on the CSA
because, at each school, they are on the edge of the woods and provide additional hiding
areas for would-be intruders who would attempt to enter campus on foot from the woods.
Entry door security was another facet that scored as a presumed weakness.
Exterior doors facing the perimeter of campus are always locked per each school’s safety
plan. Doors facing the courtyards, however, are left unlocked during the school day. If an
intruder were to evade detection, it was noted by administrators at each school that they
could easily walk into any building and wreak havoc before detection. The Safe Schools
coordinator and maintenance supervisor both also noted the courtyard-facing doors being
unlocked, adding that discussions are being held to address how to secure those doors in a
manner in which they would still promote the relatively free movement of students and
staff.
Implications for Practice
One of the reasons for conducting this case study was to help determine next steps
for SCS’s safety and security program. Since the schools opened in 1967, there has never
been a baseline set of data established regarding the efficacy of the program; therefore,
this case study will help inform the district of where it currently stands regarding safety
and security and also inform the district as it continues to enhance and improve school
safety at its two high school campuses.
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Foremost among the concerns of the adult respondents is the openness of the
perimeter of the campuses. Further, with few windows facing the perimeter of each
campus, there rarely is a set of eyes or cameras monitoring areas other than the primary
entrance. The woods, dumpster areas, and athletics fields provide cover that receives little
direct or indirect supervision during the school day. At each campus, there is sparse
fencing around the perimeter of the campuses, and it is not feasible to encircle the entire
campus; it is both cost-prohibitive and goes against CPTED principles for creating a
warm and welcoming environment for students and visitors. One option that was
introduced by the former director of operations and is supported by the Safe Schools
coordinator and maintenance supervisor is to install decorative fencing between the
buildings. Though this does nothing to secure the perimeter of the campus, it would
prevent an intruder from accessing the courtyards or school buildings. The fencing would
be decorative with gates at “normal” pathways into the main part of the campus to allow
for free egress; ingress would be controlled by a buzzer system. During the school day,
once a visitor has stopped by the campus monitoring station, a gate could be unlocked via
a buzzer system similar to those used at the elementary and middle schools. There are
also options available for the fencing that would serve the purpose of securing the inner
campus but would also be aesthetically pleasing so as not to appear intimidating or
fortress-like. For egress, the gates could utilize panic bars in the event of an emergency.
According to the Safe Schools coordinator and maintenance supervisor, utilizing this
option would greatly improve the security of the inner part of campus. Again, as with
fencing around the perimeter, this option would certainly assist in controlling access to
the campus but potentially would be cost-prohibitive.
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A second option that is receiving serious consideration is to install card reader
door entry systems on the unlocked doors facing the courtyards. Used as the primary
entrances for the school buildings, the courtyard facing doors could remain locked
throughout the school day, allowing entry into buildings with a student or staff entry card.
These systems can also be set up on timers so they can be unlocked at class changes to
allow for the free flow of students and staff. The maintenance supervisor believes “both
high schools need to have all doors locked at all times and the only efficient way that I
see doing this is adding access control to all buildings.” Though expensive, as many
mechanical measures are, installing card reader systems so doors can remain locked is not
as cost-prohibitive as decorative fencing that is connecting buildings. According to the
Safe Schools coordinator and the maintenance supervisor, this option is currently being
seriously evaluated as a next step in securing the school buildings.
Russo (2014) asserted that districts must enhance and improve the design of their
campuses to facilitate supervision. In step with this idea, Bliesner and Armes (2017)
added that the liability on school districts is too great not to provide adequate supervision
of students. Currently being undertaken by the district and as a strategic piece of the
safety and security program, new camera systems are being installed at the high schools.
WHS’s project is nearing completion and, once finished, EHS’s system will be upgraded.
In addition to installing new cameras, there will be additional cameras installed at each
campus in areas in which none previously existed. To combat the difficulty in supervising
restrooms and locker rooms, a noted deficiency in the survey results, cameras will be
installed outside the entryways to all restrooms and locker rooms. With the expectation
that these areas are frequently checked by adults, the record provided by the new cameras
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will increase each school’s ability to potentially identify individuals who may engage in
inappropriate activities in these locations.
The new camera systems will be cloud-based so they can be accessed from
anywhere on any device with appropriate permissions. The cameras being replaced are
operated by and stored on software located on physical hard drives. Their use is
cumbersome, and the technology is outdated. The new systems will also send
notifications to primary users if there is any activity on either campus after school hours.
These notifications will provide access to view activity immediately from any location.
Bliesner and Armes (2017) acknowledged that cameras are not a deterrent, per se, but
only provide a record of an event that has already happened. It bears noting, however,
that one of the former student respondents remarked that students “knew where the
cameras were,” which presumably contradicts the prior assertion.
Signage is another area that can be enhanced at both high schools and is also a
fundamental aspect of CPTED principles. As part of the territorial aspect of CPTED,
signage directs students, staff, and visitors to certain areas. It does this to guide
individuals or groups to areas that enhance opportunities for supervision. For example,
adequate directional signage for the main office will lead those individuals to the office,
instead of them having to wander around campus until they locate the office. EHS has
taken steps over the past 2 years to enhance signage, but it was noted by the SROs at each
school that more directional and location-specific signage was needed on both campuses.
An assistant principal at EHS added that it no longer is reasonable to rely on “habits” for
students, staff, and visitors to know what to do or where to go, adding that “we need to
identify buildings, offices, and athletics facilities for our own community and for visitors

111
from other schools.” Unlike additional personnel or new cameras, improving signage is a
low-cost option for enhancing territoriality and is a step that could easily and promptly be
undertaken by both schools.
Implications for this research are broad. Locally, the baseline data established
with this study can inform the district regarding next steps for its own safety and security
program. Likewise, continued assessment during implementation can provide valuable
insight into the design of the program. The survey instrument is a publicly available
document provided by the CDC and can be freely utilized at no cost. In its entirety, the
survey addresses over 300 metrics for assessing school safety. It was modified for this
research to reflect characteristics that are present on the respective campuses; sections
were omitted that pertained to characteristics not existing on either campus. Designed
specifically to measure the perceptions of the inhabitants–those for whom the program is
designed–continued assessment of the program utilizing the CSA is recommended to
ensure fidelity to the design of the program as well as to ascertain the effectiveness of
implementation.
From a broader perspective, and as previously mentioned, the CSA provides a
tremendous amount of information concerning a school. The CSA is not designed as a
comparative tool. The data derived from the assessment tool are unique to each location
and, per the CDC, are site-specific. For other schools or districts, the information gleaned
from the CSA will inform the school and district of what they are doing well, what areas
may need attention, and what areas need improvement. If not already done, it would be
beneficial for any school or district to establish baseline data from which to assess their
own safety and security programs.
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Designed for the inhabitants, the CSA can be utilized by any school or district to
assess student and staff perceptions of safety and security for their given location. Smith
and Brooks (2013) noted that security is “expected” by the inhabitants of any location,
and their perceptions of the environment are critical in determining if their expectations
are being met–the CSA can provide this information. Cozens and Love (2017) also noted
that when inhabitants feel safe, they have an increased sense of ownership in a given
space. This increased ownership of a fundamental aspect of territoriality according to
CPTED principles. As ownership increases, vigilance increases, and they become
cyclical aspects of CPTED that feed off each other.
Limitations of the Study
This case study utilized a small group of survey respondents to establish a
baseline set of data to analyze SCS’s safety and security program. The surveys each
provided a substantial set of individual statements to measure–over 9,000 data points
were provided–but the sample group of respondents itself was small.
A second limitation of the study is that the surveys were administered during the
COVID-19 pandemic. This was irrelevant for the former student respondents since they
were working from their recollections of their respective campuses. For the adult
respondents, however, the pandemic protocols instituted at each campus affected the
number of students visible during observation times (50% student capacity under the
governor’s Plan B), prohibited certain visitors, and limited the ability of others to move
around campus.
The case study conducted herein involved two rural high school campuses that
were constructed on the open concept plan–multiple buildings surrounding a central
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courtyard. The data collected through the study are not being used to compare the schools
against each other and cannot be extrapolated to other schools. The data are being used
only to establish separate sets of baseline data that are limited to each school to inform
the district’s safety and security program. Any assessment for other schools or districts
must be conducted separately due to each location’s unique circumstances and
characteristics. Any attempts by other schools or districts to replicate these findings will
not be valid.
As one of the early initiators of the safety and security program for SCS,
researcher bias could exist in the reporting of the results. A review committee was
utilized to analyze the CSA results as well as the former-student CPTED Audit. The
results of this case study are reflective of efforts to minimize bias and are reported as
such.
Recommendations for Future Research
The proliferation of violent events in recent decades requires districts to be
cognizant of protecting students and staff to the best of their abilities. As technology and
security evolve, districts must continue to analyze and measure their efforts to adapt to
some of these changes. Districts need to utilize their resources to continually survey their
safety and security programs. If a baseline set of data has not been established, the CSA
provides a detailed list of CPTED features that can be adapted and adjusted to any
campus in any school district. Periodic administration of the CSA can reinforce to school
districts that their efforts are having the desired effect of increasing safety and security
for their inhabitants.
For SCS, their current efforts need to be analyzed again in a reasonable time
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frame to establish a comparable set of data that will determine if progress has been made
in enhancing safety and security at the high schools. Doing so with deliberate speed
would also demonstrate if there was a marked difference in scores in a “normal” year
versus a pandemic-impacted year. Further, as features are added or enhanced, it would be
beneficial for SCS to continue to assess the perceptions of the very people for whom the
program is being implemented (Fennelly & Perry, 2014). It is recommended that this
metric could be established easily by a second administration of the CSA.
Reingle Gonzalez et al. (2016) noted that two types of security exist on school
campuses: actual and perceived. Actual security is what is being measured through the
CSA and the CPTED Audit; however, it is being measured through the perceptions of the
inhabitants. A significant recommendation is that the CPTED Audit be administered by
the district to current students at each school with appropriate permissions. Likewise,
expanding the study group of adult respondents–specifically to teachers–may also be
beneficial in providing a diversity of perspectives regarding actual security measures
being taken through the safety and security program (Fennelly & Perry, 2014). As
inhabitants of school campuses, I believe it is critical that both students and staff are
included in the assessment of any school’s safety and security program. Students and
staff view safety differently, according to Cozens and Love (2017); but as the
beneficiaries of an adequately designed safety and security program, their perceptions are
critical to assessing current conditions with fidelity.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a summarization of the findings of the
CSA and CPTED Audit. The findings, as reported, indicate that SCS is safe, but
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continued scrutiny is necessary to ensure efficacious implementation of the program. The
implications of the study were addressed, with recommendations made for next steps that
could be considered by the district to enhance the program. Limitations of the study were
noted, and future recommendations were made for SCS and other districts to consider
when evaluating their programs.
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CDC CPTED School Assessment
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(Adapted from cdc.org CSA Survey)
Note: Initially designed as a Google survey, this survey was administered as a paper copy
at the request of the individuals completing the surveys.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(CPTED) School Assessment
School:
Name:
Title:
Rate each line item 1-5 with 1 being the lowest level of agreement and 5 being the highest.
If you are not able to view/observe one of the items below, write UNO instead of marking a
number. If it does not exist at your school, write DNE.

Initial
Impressions
A. Initial Impressions
1. 1. Initial impressions of the school grounds are
positive.
12345
2. 2. Initial impressions of the school buildings are
positive.
12345
3. 3. Initial impressions of the school interiors are positive.
12345

The Grounds
A. Grounds:
Perimeter
4. 1. School property boundaries are delineated from adjacent
properties.
12345
5. 2. Physical or symbolic barriers along the property boundary present an
attractive appearance.
12345
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6. 3. Perimeter fencing allows for natural surveillance of school
grounds.
12345
7. 4. The perimeter is secured in areas not easily
monitored.
12345
8. 5. Signs direct approaching vehicles and pedestrians to appropriate entries to the
school property.
12345
9. 6. Posted rules are located at key points around the school
grounds.
12345

B. Ground: Points of
entry
10. 1. Entries to the school grounds are attractive and
welcoming.
12345
11. 2. There is an attractive and visible sign indicating the school's name near the primary
entry.
12345
12. 3. Signs at each primary entrance to the school property direct students, staff,
visitors, and delivery traffic to appropriate locations.
12345
13. 4. Entries to the school property can be easily
monitored.
12345
14. 5. Secondary pedestrian entries are secured during school
hours.
12345
15. 6. Secondary vehicular entries are secured during school
hours.
12345

C. Grounds: Parent Drop-off/Pickups
16. 1. Parent drop-off/pickup locations are clearly marked by signage, pavement,
and curb treatments.
12345
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17. 2. Students are dropped-off and picked up at authorized
locations.
12345
18. 3. Parent drop-off/pickup areas are
well lit.
12345
19. 4. Parent drop-off/pickup areas easily
monitored.
12345
20. 5. There are authorized adults visible and available for assistance in proximity of parent
drop- off areas during arrivals.
12345
21. 6. There are authorized adults visible and available for assistance in proximity of
parent pickup areas during departures.
12345
22. 7. There is sufficient capacity in parent drop-off/pickup areas for the orderly
movement of vehicles.
12345
23. 8. Parent drop-offs proceed in an orderly
manner.
12345

24. 9. Parent pickups proceed in an orderly
manner.
12345

D. Grounds: Bus Unloading and
Loading
25. 1. Bus unloading and loading areas are clearly marked by signage, pavement,
and/or curb treatments.
12345
26. 2. Bus unloading and loading areas are
well lit.
12345
27. 3. Bus unloading and loading areas are easily
monitored.
12345
28. 4. There are authorized adults visible and available for assistance in proximity
to the bus unloading area during arrivals.
12345
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29. 5. There are authorized adults visible and available for assistance in proximity of bus
loading area during departures.
12345
30. 6. There is sufficient capacity in the bus unloading/loading area for the orderly
movement of vehicles.
12345
31. 7. Bus unloading proceeds in an orderly
manner.
12345
32. 8. Bus loading proceeds in an orderly
manner.
12345

E. Grounds: Vehicular Routes
33. 1. Vehicular travel routes are clearly
marked.
12345
34. 2. Vehicular travel routes are in good
condition.
12345
35. 3. There are traffic-calming measures on adjacent public streets that limit vehicular
speeds where students cross.
12345
36. 4. Delivery activities are orderly and do not interfere with normal school
functions.
12345

F. Grounds: Parking
Areas
37. 1. Parking lot entrances and exits are clearly
marked.
12345
38. 2. Parking areas are delineated for staff and
visitors.
12345
39. 3. All parking spaces are clearly
marked.
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12345
40. 4. Parking lots are easily
monitored.
12345
41. 5. Parking lots are in good
condition.
12345
42. 6. Parking lots are
well lit.
12345
43. 7. There are no signs of vandalism in
parking lots.
12345
44. 8. Vehicular traffic flows in an orderly manner in and out of parking
lots.
12345
45. 9. Visitor parking is located directly adjacent to the main entry of the administrative
offices.
12345
46. 10. Visitor parking areas are visible from adjacent
buildings.
12345

G. Grounds: Exterior Pedestrian Pathways and Gathering
Areas
47. 1. There are signs directing visitors to the office.
12345
48. 2. There is a wayfinding system, which includes signs; plant materials; and art
work, monuments or other landmarks.
12345
49. 3. Pedestrian crossings of adjacent public streets are clearly marked by signage,
pavement treatment and/or curb treatment.
12345
50. 4. Pedestrian pathways on school property are separated from vehicular routes by
curbing, color markings, landscaping and/or other real symbolic barriers.
12345

51. 5. Pedestrian pathways on school property are easily monitored.
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12345
52. 6. Pedestrian pathways on school property are in good condition.
12345
53. 7. Pedestrian pathways on school property are well lit.
12345
54. 8. Pedestrian flows on school property are orderly.
12345
55. 9. There are pedestrian amenities such as seating and trash receptacles located along
the key pedestrian pathways.
12345
56. 10. Pedestrian amenities are in good condition.
12345
57. 11. Pedestrian pathways and gathering places are easily
monitored.
12345
58. 12. Public telephones are located in areas that are easily
monitored.
12345
59. 13. Landscaping elements do not allow easy access to roofs, windows, or other
upper level areas.
12345

H. Grounds: Exterior Athletic Areas
60. 1. Exterior athletic areas are easily monitored.
12345
61. 2. Exterior athletic areas are in good condition.
12345
62. 3. Posted rules are located near exterior athletic area entries and exits.
12345
63. 4. There are well-defined and easily monitored areas for storing backpacks, jackets, and
other personal items.
12345

I. Grounds: Other
64. 1. Access to dumpsters is controlled.
12345
65. 2. There are no hiding places in or around dumpster areas.
12345
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66. 3. Dumpsters are in good condition.
12345
67. 4. There are usually no foul odors in or around dumpster areas.
12345
68. 5. Site utilities are secured.
12345

J. Grounds: General
69. 1. The organization of the school campus is easily comprehended.
12345
70. 2. The school grounds are attractive.
12345
71. 3. The school grounds are enhanced with landscaping, student artwork, monuments
and/or other physical means.
12345
72. 4. There are outdoor learning areas that provide out-of-doors opportunities for
students.
12345
73. 5. The school grounds are in good condition.
12345
74. 6. Remote areas are visible from occupied buildings, pedestrian pathways, or vehicular
travel routes.
12345
75. 7. Seldom-used areas or buildings are secured to prevent access.
12345
76. 8. There are no hiding places created by landscaping or fencing.
12345
77. 9. The grounds are easily viewed from school buildings.
12345
78. 10. There are no unattractive barriers such as barbed or razor wire on the school
grounds.
12345
79. 11. Security devices are unimposing.
12345
80. 12. There are examples of student involvement with campus beautification
such as landscaping maintenance, gardens, memorials, art projects and/or other
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physical enhancements.
12345
81. 13. Examples of student involvement in campus beautification are in good
condition.
12345
82. 14. There are no signs of vandalism.
12345
83. 15. There are no foul odors.
12345
84. 16. There are no continuously occurring loud noises on school grounds.
12345

The
Building
s
A. Building(S): Entries and
Exits
85. 1. The public entry is located adjacent to the administration area and visitor
parking.
12345
86. 2. The public entry is well defined with architectural features, signs, lighting,
artwork, landscaping and/or landmarks such as flags.
12345
87. 3. Extensive windows and glazed doors enhance natural surveillance of the public
entry.
12345
88. 4. Entrances and exits are easily monitored.
12345
89. 5. Secondary entrance and exit doors are secured in the closed position.
12345
90. 6. The design of emergency exits, such as the use of alarms, deters access from the
outside.
12345
91. 7. Exterior waiting areas are well lit.
12345
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92. 8. Exterior waiting area amenities provide shelter from foul weather.
12345
93. 9. Exterior waiting areas are visible from adjacent buildings.
12345

B. Building(s): Exterior
Walls
94. 1. The design of the exterior walls does not create hard-to-see locations or hiding
places/
12345
95. 2. Exterior walls are in good condition.
12345
96. 3. Murals, artwork, landscaping and/or architectural treatments have been used to
enhance blank or barren exterior walls.
12345
97. 4. There are no signs of graffiti on exterior walls.
12345
98. 5. Doors and windows are in good condition.
12345
99. 6. Screening walls and/or other architectural features do not allow for easy access to
the roof or upper level areas.
12345

C. Building(s):
Courtyards
100. 1. Entries to courtyards are easily
monitored.
12345
101. 2. Courtyards are visible from windows and doors of the school buildings.
12345
102. 3. Courtyard landscaping elements, including walls, planters and seating, do not
allow easy
access to roofs, windows, or other upper level areas.
12345
103. 4. Courtyards are enhanced with landscaping, student artwork, and/or other physical
means.
12345
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104. 5. Courtyards are easily monitored.
12345
105. 6. Courtyards are in good condition.
12345
106. 7. There are no signs of graffiti.
12345

D. Building(s): General
107. 1. Buildings are organized to promote natural surveillance of the school campus.
12345
108. 2. All buildings have highly visible identification names and/or numbers.
12345
109. 3. Building design and architectural attributes present an attractive appearance.
12345
110. 4. Building Materials and colors are attractive.
12345
111. 5. All buildings are in good
condition.
12345
112. 6. Building mounted security devices, such as cameras and window grates, are
unimposing.
12345
113. 7. Window and door security devices are attractive.
12345
114. 8. Covers for exterior walkways and stairs are designed to limit easy access to
roofs, windows, or other upper level areas.
12345

The
Interiors
A. Interior: Main/Visitor
Lobby
115. 1. The lobby is attractive, cheerful, and inviting.
12345
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116. 2. Entry security devices are unimposing.
12345
117. 3. Pedestrian flows through entry security devices are orderly.
12345
118. 4. The lobby is well
lit.
12345
119. 5. The lobby is easily
monitored.
12345
120. 6. Signs direct visitors to
the office.
12345

121. 7. Signs provide directions to major school areas, i.e. administrative offices, cafeteria,
media room, auditorium, gymnasium, etc.
12345
122. 8. The lobby is visible from adjacent administrative offices.
12345
123. 9. The lobby is enhanced with plants, artwork, posters and/or other physical
means.
12345
124. 10. Extensive use of windows in the lobby area provides natural surveillance
opportunities.
12345
125. 11. Motivational signs, temporary or permanent, herald accomplishments, reflect
student
pride, give positive messages, and otherwise encourage student
excellence.
12345
126. 12. Student displays include a wide range of student interests and cultural
backgrounds.
12345
127. 13. The lobby is in good
condition.
12345

B. Interior: Student Entry Areas - Other Than Main Lobby
128. 1. The entry areas are attractive, cheerful, and
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inviting.
12345
129. 2. Entry security devices are unimposing.
12345
130. 3. Pedestrian flows through entry security devices are orderly.
12345
131. 4. The entry areas are well lit.
12345
132. 5. The entry areas are easily monitored.
12345
133. 6. Signs direct visitors to
the office.
12345
134. 7. Signs provide directions to major school areas, i.e. administrative offices, cafeteria,
media room, auditorium, gymnasium, etc.
12345
135. 8. The entry areas are enhanced with plants, artwork, posters and/or other physical
means.
12345

136. 9. Extensive use of windows in the entry areas provides natural surveillance
opportunities.
12345
137. 10. Motivational signs, temporary or permanent, herald accomplishments, reflect
student pride, give positive messages and otherwise encourage student excellence.
12345
138. 11. Student displays include a wide range of student interests and cultural
backgrounds.
12345
139. 12. The entry areas are in good condition.
12345

C. Interior: Administrative
Offices
140. 1. Access to the school staff area(s) is
controlled.
12345
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141. 2. Extensive use of windows in the administrative areas provides natural
surveillance of and for adjoining interior spaces.
12345
142. 3. Extensive use of windows in the administrative areas provides natural
surveillance of and for exterior spaces.
12345
143. 4. Counseling areas are in good condition.
12345
144. 5. Counseling areas are enhanced with plants, artwork and other physical
means.
12345
145. 6. Motivational signs, temporary or permanent, herald accomplishments, reflect student
pride, give positive messages and otherwise encourage student excellence.
12345
146. 7. Student displays include a wide range of student interests and cultural
backgrounds.
12345
147. 8. The administrative areas are in good condition.
12345

D. Interior:
Corridors
148. 1. Interior corridors are well lit.
12345
149. 2. Interior corridors are easily monitored.
12345

150. 3. There are no hiding
places.
12345
151. 4. Pedestrian flows are orderly.
12345
152. 5. Interior corridors are of sufficient capacity to allow orderly movement between
classes.
12345
153. 6. Interior corridors are free of obstacles that impede orderly pedestrian flow.
12345
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154. 7. Interior corridor light controls are secured to prevent unauthorized access.
12345
155. 8. There are authorized adults visible in the interior corridors during arrivals.
12345
156. 9. There are authorized adults visible in the interior corridors during class
changes.
12345
157. 10. There are authorized adults visible in the interior corridors during departures.
12345
158. 11. Motivational signs, temporary or permanent, herald accomplishments, reflect
student pride, give positive messages and otherwise encourage student excellence.
12345
159. 12. Student displays include a wide range of student interests and cultural
backgrounds.
12345
160. 13. Interior corridors are attractive and cheerful.
12345
161. 14. Interior corridors are in good condition.
12345

E. Interior:
Restrooms
162. 1. Multiple stall restrooms have open zigzag entries, rather than door systems.
12345
163. 2. Restrooms with solid doors have vents to increase the opportunity for
auditory
surveillan
ce.
12345
164. 3. Restroom entries are easily viewed from other active areas.
12345
165. 4. Restrooms are well lit.
12345
166. 5. Restroom light controls are secured to prevent unauthorized access.
12345
167. 6. There are no unusually foul odors in the restrooms.
12345
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168. 7. There are no signs of graffiti.
12345
169. 8. There are no other signs of vandalism.
12345
170. 9. Stall doors and locks are in good condition.
12345
171. 10. Toilets, urinals and lavatories are in good
condition.
12345
172. 11. The restroom ceiling treatment does not provide access to a hiding
place.
12345
173. 12. Restrooms are in good condition.
12345

F. Interior: Classrooms
174. 1. Classrooms have windows that allow for natural surveillance of exterior
spaces.
12345
175. 2. Classroom door windows allow for natural surveillance into the classrooms.
12345
176. 3. Furniture, lockers, or other objects do not compromise natural surveillance
within the classroom.
12345
177. 4. Classrooms can be secured and locked down from the inside.
12345
178. 5. Secured classroom doors can be exited in an emergency.
12345
179. 6. Classroom door(s) are secured when the classroom is not in use.
12345
180. 7. Classrooms are
well lit.
12345
181. 8. Motivational signs, temporary or permanent, herald accomplishments, reflect student
pride, give positive messages and otherwise encourage student excellence.
12345
182. 9. Classrooms are

142
cheerful.
12345
183. 10. Classrooms are in good condition.
12345

G. Interior: In-school Suspension Areas
184. 1. In-school suspension areas are easily
monitored.
12345
185. 2. In-school suspension areas are enhanced with plants, artwork or other physical
means.
12345
186. 3. In-school suspension areas are in good condition.
12345

H. Interior: Cafeteria(s) and Food
Courts
187. 1. Cafeteria(s) and food courts have well-defined
entry(s).
12345
188. 2. The cafeteria entry(s) is easily
monitored.
12345
189. 3. There are authorized adults visible and available for
assistance.
12345
190. 4. Kitchen and serving areas have limited
access.
12345
191. 5. The student serving line is
orderly.
12345
192. 6. The pedestrian flow within the cafeteria(s) is orderly.
12345
193. 7. The pedestrian flow around the outside of the cafeteria(s) is orderly.
12345
194. 8. There is sufficient capacity for all students to sit within authorized
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locations.
12345
195. 9. There is sufficient space between tables to allow orderly
circulation.
12345
196. 10. The behavior in the cafeteria(s) is orderly.
12345
197. 11. The cafeteria(s) is enhanced with plants, artwork, posters and/or other physical
means.
12345
198. 12. Student displays and other artwork include a wide range of student interest and
cultural backgrounds.
12345
199. 13. There are no foul odors.
12345
200. 14. Entrance is secured when the room is not in
use.
12345
201. 15. The cafeteria(s) is in good condition.
12345

I. Interior: Auditorium(s)
202. 1. The auditorium(s) has well defined entry(s).
12345
203. 2. The auditorium(s) is easily monitored.
12345
204. 3. All entrances are secured when the room is not in use.
12345
205. 4. The auditorium(s) is in good
condition.
12345

J. Interior: Gymnasium
206. 1. The gymnasium(s) is easily monitored.
12345
207. 2. Access to the underside of bleachers, whether open or closed, is limited.
12345
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208. 3. The gymnasium(s) is well lit.
12345
209. 4. Light controls are secured to prevent unauthorized access.
12345
210. 5. Entrance is secured when the room is not in
use.
12345
211. 6. The gymnasium(s) is in good condition.
12345

K. Interior: Locker Rooms (Men/Boys)
212. 1. Locker areas are easily monitored.
12345
213. 2. Lockers in the center do not obstruct visibility.
12345
214. 3. Lockers are adequately spaced to avoid
crowding.
12345
215. 4. Lockers and/or locker doors are seethrough.
12345
216. 5. Shower areas are easily
monitored.
12345
217. 6. All areas of the locker room are
well lit.
12345
218. 7. Light controls are secured to prevent unauthorized access.
12345
219. 8. There are no unusually foul
odors.
12345
220. 9. The ceiling treatment does not provide a hiding place.
12345
221. 10. Entrance is secured when a room is not in use.
12345
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222. 11. All areas of the locker room are in good condition.
12345

L. Interior: Locker Rooms (Women/Girls)
223. 1. Locker areas are easily monitored.
12345
224. 2. Lockers in the center do not obstruct visibility.
12345
225. 3. Lockers are adequately spaced to avoid
crowding.
12345
226. 4. Lockers and/or locker doors are seethrough.
12345
227. 5. Shower areas are easily
monitored.
12345
228. 6. All areas of the locker room are well lit.
12345
229. 7. Light controls are secured to prevent unauthorized access.
12345
230. 8. There are no unusually foul
odors.
12345
231. 9. The ceiling treatment does not provide a hiding place.
12345
232. 10. Entrance is secured when the room is not in use.
12345
233. 11. All areas of the locker room are in good
condition.
12345

M. Interior: Libraries and Media Centers
234. 1. The library or media center has a well-defined entry.
12345
235. 2. The entrance is easily monitored by staff and volunteers.
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236. 3. Activity within the library area is easily monitored.
12345
237. 4. Motivational signs, temporary or permanent, herald accomplishments, reflect student
pride, give positive messages and otherwise encourage student excellence.
12345
238. 5. Student displays include a wide range of student interest and cultural
backgrounds.
12345
239. 6. The library is secured when not in use.
12345
240. 7. Rooms within the library are secured when not in use.
12345
241. 8. All areas of the library are in good condition.
12345

N. Interior:
General
242. 1. There is an abundance of natural light within interior spaces.
12345
243. 2. Interior spaces are well lit.
12345
244. 3. Interior spaces are attractive and cheerful.
12345
245. 4. The organization of interior spaces is easily comprehended.
12345
246. 5. Visitors have distinctive and highly visible name tags.
12345
247. 6. Staff and teachers have highly visible name tags.
12345
248. 7. Security personnel wear distinctive clothing and have distinct, visible identification
badges.
12345
249. 8. Interior security equipment is unimposing.
12345
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250. 9. Interior walls are in good condition.
12345
251. 10. Electrical panels are secured.
12345
252. 11. Interior doors and windows are in good condition.
12345
253. 12. Interior ceilings are in good
condition.
12345
254. 13. Interior light fixtures are in good condition.
12345
255. 14. Interior features such as clocks, displays, signs and furnishings are in good
condition.
12345
256. 15. There is sufficient capacity for the orderly storing of backpacks and jackets
throughout the school.
12345
257. 16. There are no visible signs of vandalism in interior spaces.
12345

258. 17.Interior spaces are enhanced with plants, artwork, and/or other physical
means.
12345
259. 18. The temperature in interior spaces is neither too hot nor too
cold.
12345
260. 19. The interior air quality
is fresh.
12345
261. 20. Obsolete or underutilized spaces are secured to prevent access by unauthorized
persons.
12345
262. 21. There are no continuously occurring loud noises in the interior spaces.
12345
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Global
Impressions
A. Global
Impressions
263. 1. The school is
inviting.
12345
264. 2. The school is attractive.
12345
265. 3. The school is cheerful.
12345
266. 4. The atmosphere is
uplifting.
12345

Additional
Observations
267. Any additional observations regarding the school
environment. *
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Assessment Day
Information
268.
Assessment
Date:
269. Assessment
Time:
270. Assessment day weather:

271. Unique factors regarding the day(s) of the
assessment

272. Any additional observations regarding the school
environment
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Appendix C
Eastern High School

151
Student parking

Entrances to be
closed 8 am – 3 pm

Campus monitor

Eastern
High
School

Main
administrative
offices

*Map copied from Google Maps

152
Appendix D
Western High School

153

Western High School
Student parking

Main
administrative
offices

Student parking

Entrance to be
closed 8 am – 3 pm

Campus monitor

Entrance to be closed
8 am – 3 pm

*Map copied from Google Maps
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Appendix E
School Safety and Guard Buildings

155
Taken from Campus Monitor Training; August 16, 2018

Names Redacted
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Appendix F
CPTED School Conditions Audit
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Note: This survey was delivered to former-student respondents as a Google survey.
CPTED School Conditions Audit (SCA)Circle One-

Eastern HS

Western HS

Please answer the following questions with as much detail as possible1. How safe was your high school? This is asking for your gut reaction to your
school and campus.

2. Regarding campus safety and security, what are some things that you think your
school did well?

3. Regarding campus safety and security, what are some areas that you think your
school could have done better?

4. Are there any items relating to campus safety and security that you felt were
lacking or missing altogether?

5. Were there any areas on campus that you believe are good “hiding” places?

6. Was there adequate exterior lighting during the normal hours of operation?

7. Did the adults on campus provide adequate supervision during the school day?
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8. Did the adults on campus adequately supervise common areas in which students
gather during breaks or between classes?

9. Were pedestrian routes through campus easy to identify?

10. Did having a School Resource Officer on campus make you feel safer?

11. Did the guard hut make you feel safer?

12. Did the individual working in the guard hut make you feel safer?

13. Did trees or bushes interfere with being able to see certain areas of campus?

14. Did trees or bushes provide places where individuals could hide or not be easily
detected?

15. While at school, did you know who to notify if you needed assistance?

16. Were buildings, offices, or classrooms easily identified with appropriate signage?

159

For the following items- As they relate to safety/security and your perception of
your high school campus, please note whether each statement, characteristic,
location or trait was (S) satisfactory or (U) unsatisfactory.

CPTED Audit Checklist
Satisfactory
(S)
Image of school from main road
Lighting of walkways/pedestrian areas
Sightlines (easy to see other areas)
Hiding spots
Land surrounding campus
Courtyard
Media Center
Cafeteria
Student restrooms
Locker rooms
Auditorium
A building lobby
Adult supervision of student common areas (ex:
courtyard)
Adult supervision of buildings/hallways
Student parking areas
Fences on/around campus
Evidence of graffiti on campus
Evidence of vandalism on campus
Painted areas are in good repair
Number of trees
Number of shrubs/bushes
Lawn/grass maintenance
Trees/shrub maintenance
Handicap accessibility
Evacuation routes are clear (fire drills/lockdowns)
Main entrance welcoming
Main entrance easy to identify
Sign in front of school
Main office easy to identify for visitors
Welcoming reception area
Lockdown procedures

Unsatisfactory
(U)
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Fire drill procedures
Emergency communication devices/hardware
Security cameras
Door knobs
Door locks
Number of windows
Maintenance of windows
Bus loading area
Buildings are easy to identify (A, B, C, Media
Center, etc.)
Classroom signs
Athletics facilities are easy to identify
Main office is easy to identify
Visitor parking
Access to campus for parents/families

Please note any additional observations here:

Thank you for your participation in this study.

Adapted from State of Western Australia Graffiti Taskforce
https://www.goodbyegraffiti.wa.gov.au/~/media/Files/GoodbyeGraffiti/CPTEDAuditChecklist.pdf?la=en

